Introduction

Many tertiary education institutions engage education agents to recruit international students.  For example, according to the National Association for College Admission Counseling (2021), almost 50% of American universities engage these agents.  Most institutions, however, complement this strategy with many other practices to recruit international students, such as virtual fairs, video tours, webinars, social media, and partnerships with foreign high schools, embassies, and other organizations (Choudaha et al., 2013)

 

The benefit of these agents is that institutions can market themselves to international applicants, without heavy investment in these nations.  Besides diminishing the costs of travel, agents can

 

• act as cultural mediators—helping applicants understand the application materials and other documents from their cultural perspective (Robinson-Pant & Magyar, 2018)

• utilize their local knowledge and networks to identify applicants that institutions would otherwise overlook (Coco, 2015)

• inspire applicants to consider universities, institutions, or pathways of which they were not aware before (e.g., Bohman, 2010)

 

The drawback is that institutions cannot regular monitor or regulate the behavior of these agents (Coffey & Perry, 2013; Galbraith & Brabner, 2013; Goi, 2015; Raimo et al., 2015). Consequently, agents may communicate false information or represent the institution unfavorably.

 

Sometimes, researchers use the term agent to refer either to a company that recruits international students or to a person, working independently or as an employee of a recruitment company, who recruits international students.  Alternatively, and perhaps more commonly, researchers might utilize the term agent to refer only to individuals and agency to refer only to companies (for a discussion, see Xue, 2022)

 

Risks of education agents: Information that is incorrect or incomplete

If tertiary education institutions depend on education agents to recruit international students, these agents might, inadvertently or deliberately, disseminate information about the institution that is incorrect or incomplete (Galbraith & Brabner, 2013; Huang et al., 2016). As Brabner and Galbraith (2013) underscored, because agents typically earn a commission on each applicant they enroll, they might be motivated to distort the information they convey to individuals. For example, agents may relay erroneous information about

 

• the tuition fees or other costs that students incur

• the likelihood of admission

• the work opportunities during and after students complete the course

• the reputation of this institution or course

  

Agents might also, inadvertently or deliberately, disseminate false information about their role.  For example, they might conceal they have been engaged by the institution—and, therefore, depict themselves as impartial rather than biased (Roy, 2017).  Even more disconcertingly, these agents may communicate false information about fees or finances, increasingly the likelihood they might perpetrate financial misconduct.  They might, for instance, appropriate some of the tuition fees (Galbraith & Brabner, 2013).  Similarly, they might communicate false information to the institution, such as submit fraudulent invoices.     

 

Indeed, rather than disseminate false information themselves, agents might encourage international applicants to submit false information.  If applicants believe these applicants are not eligible, they might instruct these individuals to misrepresent themselves on personal statements, to submit falsified documents and forged transcripts, or to organize fictitious recommendation letters (Galbraith & Brabner, 2013; Independent Commission Against Corruption, 2015).   

 

Risks of education agents: Unprofessional representation

Rather than disseminate false or misleading information, education agents might exhibit unprofessional behavior, potentially tarnishing the brand and reputation of the institutions they represent as well as deterring potential students (Galbraith & Brabner, 2013; Huang et al., 2016).  These agents might seem forceful, unfriendly, or tardy.  Or they might breach the confidentiality of student data. 

 

Risks of education agents: Unfavorable or confidential information about the institution

In some instances, education agents may relay unfavorable information about the institution.  If these agents feel the financial incentives are inadequate, they might denigrate the institution and encourage students to apply to another university or accept another offer (Di Maria, 2014). 

 

Alternatively, these agents may disclose sensitive or confidential information about the institution.  To illustrate, they might disseminate information that is commercially sensitive, such as a plan to close a campus. 

 

Practices of institutions to monitor and to regulate education agents

Because education agents can pose a risk to institutions, institutions need to introduce a range of tools and practices to monitor and to regulate these individuals. Nikula and Kivistö (2020) reviewed the guidelines and recommendations that various bodies have proposed to achieve this goal.  The researchers extracted 13 guidelines from the websites of relevant government and industry bodies, from internet searches, and from scanning references of retrieved documents.  These 13 guidelines were produced by a range of organizations including

 

• the relevant departments in the Australian and Queensland governments

• the Victorian TAFE international

• the Independent Commission against Corruption in New South Wales

• the New Zealand Qualifications Authority

• the American International Recruitment Council (2016)

• Coffey and Perry (2013), as part of a contract with the Council of Ministers of Education in Canada

 

The guidelines referred to seven tools or practices that institutions can apply to monitor and to regulate education agents.  First, all the guidelines recommend an analysis of student data.  To illustrate, for each agent, institutions should assess

 

• the proportion of successful applicants and unsuccessful applicants—including visa refusal rates— to assess the quality and suitability of these applicants  

• the retention rates, completion rates, and GPA of these applicants

• the number of courses to which these individuals applied to demonstrate the agents are promoting a diversity of programs

• compare the performance of one agent to other agents in similar regions or circumstances

 

Second, all the guidelines alluded to the benefits of field audits.  That is, representatives of institutions should observe the practices of education agents.  They might, for example, attend recruitment events to check whether the agents are displaying or disseminating suitable information as well as behaving professionally.  They might even ask these agents questions that assess their knowledge of the courses and campuses.  Nevertheless, several barriers limit the utility of these field audits.  To illustrate

 

• because of language and cultural barriers, representatives of institutions may not be able to evaluate the behavior of these agents fairly; practices that seem impolite in the home nation may be suitable in other nations, for example

• agents might modify their usual practice when they know they are observed

• the staff of institutions may be reluctant to evaluate these agents harshly, because they may be concerned this feedback could jeopardize the likelihood the agents recruit international students in the future

 

Third, all the guidelines alluded to the benefits of regular telephone calls, emails, or other modes of communication with agents.  This communication, although primarily touted as a method to support and train agents, may also enable institutions to evaluate the knowledge and practices of agents.   Nevertheless, to be effective, the communication should be bi-directional, rather than merely opportunities in which staff impart knowledge and information to agents.

 

Fourth, all guidelines recommended that institutions should collate student feedback to monitor agents.  Institutions can both collect incidental feedback, such as complaints from students, as well as actively seek feedback, such as organize focus groups, interviews, or surveys.  For example, surveys could invite students to rate the degree to which the information they received from education agents was accurate and useful as well as the extent to which the agents were professional.  Questions that assess fees, subcontracting, or other potential misconduct could be included as well.  Other stakeholders, such as applicants and parents, could also be surveyed occasionally.  Nevertheless, several impediments can diminish the utility of this feedback, such as

 

• impaired memory of past events

• concerns about the intent of these questions

• limited knowledge about how agents should have behaved

 

Fifth, fewer than half the guidelines recommended that institutions audit the brochures, websites, or other marketing paraphernalia that agents utilize.  To illustrate, institutions can assess whether websites refer specified the CRICOS code and disseminate accurate information. 

 

Sixth, some guidelines refer to peer reviews in which education providers may share relevant information with one another.  To illustrate, universities who share the same agents could disclose complaints they receive about these agents.  Some of this information could be garnered from professional certifications of agents—because these certifications sometimes provide information about complaints or de-registration.  In practice, government agencies, professional organizations, or other reliable third parties could mediate this dissemination of information.    

 

Finally, although only mentioned in one document, research suggests that mystery shopping could be beneficial as well.  That is, institutions could, occasionally, engage individuals to pose as prospective students and experience the counselling and application process.  These individuals can then assess the accuracy of information and quality of service.  This approach is perhaps the only opportunity in which institutions can monitor who agents treated individuals who never applied 

 

Practices of institutions to monitor and to regulate education agents: Underlying theories

As Xue (2022) outlined, researchers tend to apply two main theories to justify which practices institutions should apply to monitor and to regulate education agents: agency theory and stewardship theory.  Proponents of agency theory define the agent as a person who has been granted the right to act on behalf of another person or organization, called the principal.  Sometimes, the interests of agents and principals diverge.  For example, education agents earn income if one of their clients enrolls.  In contrast, institutions earn more income if these clients also complete the course.  When the interests of agents and principals diverge, principals need to introduce controls to regulate the behavior of their agents (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).

 

In contrast, trust-based stewardship theory challenges the assumption that agents strive only to pursue their own interests.  According to stewardship theory, agents who feel empowered and trusted will strive to benefit the institution (Davis et al., 1997). 

 

According to Xue (2022), who surveyed 316 members of the American International Recruitment Council, representing both universities and agents, most US universities seem to adopt agency theory.  That is, they strive to monitor and regulate, rather than empower and entrust, education agents.  Nevertheless, when institutions did show more trust and grant agents more discretion, both parties were more likely to be satisfied with the relationship.    

 

Specifically, in this survey, participants first answered questions about how often they experienced various practices, such as “All interactions are formal; informal contacts are avoided” or “The university and agents are equal partners in the relationship”—representing agency theory and stewardship theory respectively.  Next, participants answered the same questions, but indicated which practices they believe should be applied.  Finally, participants wrote about the benefits and challenges of international student recruitment in their role. 

 

The results showed that participants were more likely to perceive the practices that epitomize agency as more common than practices that epitomize stewardship in all facets of the arrangement, such as the instructions to agents, incentives to agents, management of relationships, and monitoring of performance.  Yet, in general, agents were dissatisfied with these practices: They believed that practices that represent stewardship theory should have been applied more frequently than in practice.

 

Practices of institutions to monitor and to regulate education agents: Legal considerations

Institutions that engage agents to recruit international students should seek legal advice (West & Addington, 2014).  Institutions not only need to be attuned to the legal considerations in their own nation, they also need to be attuned to the legal considerations in the countries from which they recruit applicants.  To illustrate, to preclude legal complications, if institutions engage recruitment agencies in China, they should check these agencies are approved as legal entities by the Chinese Ministry of Education (West & Addington, 2014).  

 

Likewise, institutions must comply with the standards in their nation. For example, in America, institutions must observe a set of guidelines, or good practice principles, that a body, called the National Association for College Admission Counseling, have developed.  To illustrate, if institutions do engage agents, students and families must be informed of this relationship between the institution and agent. 

 

Nikula (2022) revealed how the governments in Australia and New Zealand have, since the 1990s, gradually introduced more regulations to protect the rights of international students.  In Australia, codes and laws around international students did not allude to agents until the Code of Practice in the Provision of International Education and Training Service (1994).  The code indicated that institutions are responsible for the actions of their appointed agents but, because contracts were not mandated, this responsibility was not accountable.  Institutions also needed to implement practices that guarantee the agents serve in the interests of applicants and providers.

 

In 2001, the ESOS or Education Services for Overseas Students legislation included this code but shifted the emphasis to the interests and priorities of the government, such as immigration goals, and not of the institutions.  For example, the institutions were obliged to check that recruitment was undertaken with integrity and accuracy as well as ethically and responsibly.  The institution should not engage with agents suspected of false or misleading recruitment.  Nevertheless, despite these changes, stakeholders recognized the shortfalls in this legislation, because agents were not especially accountable to the institutions. 

 

After various reviews, the regulations have become increasingly stringent. Since 2019, Australian institutions can engage agents to recruit international students only if they establish a contract that includes specific provisions, such as the obligation of institutions to monitor the performance and behavior of agents.  Institutions must publish and disclose the agents to students.  Agents must communicate honestly, declare conflicts of interest, maintain confidentiality, and fulfill other behavioral standards. Except in specific circumstances, if agents engage in misconduct, their contract must be terminated. 

 

A similar trajectory of changes was observed in New Zealand. During the 1990s, the New Zealand Education International introduced a code of practice around recruitment, but agents were not mentioned until a revision in 1996.  For example, this code indicated that agents must convey accurate and timely information and to inform students about immigration requirements. The only onus on institutions was to check that agents were suitably qualified and trained.  Over time, this code has strengthened. Since 2019, institutions in New Zealand must now conduct reference checks on all agents. These institutions must also communicate updated information about courses to agents. 

 

Nevertheless, according to Nikula (2022), these standards in Australia and New Zealand do not adequately protect international students.  To illustrate

 

• when they select agents, Australian institutions do not need to conduct due diligence, such as reference checks, criminal record checks, and language certificates.

• the standards do not specify how knowledge should be imparted to agents.  Consequently, providers could merely distribute a few weblinks rather than introduce online modules, coupled with assessments, to assess outcomes. 

• in both nations, institutions do not need to disclose the roles and responsibilities of agents, compromising transparency.

• in both nations, institutions do not need to disclose how they compensate agents; students need to be aware of disparities in commission levels, because these differences could explain why agents might have recommended a particular institution.

 

Determinants of practices of institutions to monitor and to regulate education agents

How institutions manage agents may depend on the governance approach that is adopted.  Specifically, Huang et al. (2022) surveyed key informants, such as pro vice chancellors, of higher education institutions in Australia, UK, and the USA.  Participants answered questions about

 

• the degree to which they control the services and practices of agents

• satisfaction with agents and rates of conversation from application to enrolment

• whether the contract refers to the monitoring of agents

• whether the contract refers to information exchange and joint consent while constructing the contract

• the degree to which the contract is detailed and extensive

• the degree to which the contract refers to communication and responsibilities of each party to promote coordination and cooperation, and so forth

• the number of agents with which each institute operates

 

Analysis uncovered four clusters of governance approaches.  Specifically, institutions may be

 

• strategic hybrids: construct detailed contracts but collaborate effectively—exchanging information and seeking joint consent—while constructing the contract, usually engaging only a small number of agents; this model epitomizes a hybrid of explicit contracts but cooperative relationships

• pragmatic operators, construct detailed contracts but with a large number of agents and thus tend to impose the contract rather than construct the contract jointly and collaboratively

• flexible friends: construct contracts that are not as detailed and construct this contract jointly and collaboratively

• laissez faire operators: construct contracts that are not as detailed but tend to impose the contract rather than construct the contract jointly and collaboratively

 

When institutions adopted the strategic hybrid approach, they tended to be satisfied with the performance and behavior of agents—especially if they engaged only a small number of agents or monitored the agents carefully.  When institutions adopted the pragmatic approach, they were satisfied with agents only if these monitored these agents carefully.   

 

References

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