Introduction

To maintain their status and productivity in a changing and dynamic landscape, universities and other tertiary education institutions need to shift their values, priorities, policies, and practices frequently.  They need to embrace innovation and reform.  Yet, many scholars acknowledge that change in tertiary education institution is often stymied, delayed, or sporadic (e.g., Boyer Commission on Educating Undergraduates in the Research University, 1998; Evans and Henrichsen, 2008).  Researchers and commentators have thus proposed and assessed a range of approaches these institutions could adopt to overcome this problem.

 

To implement strategic change, some tertiary education institutions merely adopt the approaches that businesses often embrace.  However, as many scholars content (Rowley et al., 1997), the approaches that are effective in business settings are seldom effective in universities or similar organizations.  That is, these institutions are not configured like typical businesses.  Their funding models, hierarchies, and priorities are distinct.  The practices are more regulated as well.  Accordingly, as many researchers and scholars have observed, many of the strategic changes that tertiary education institutes implement do not fulfill their intended goals or KPIs (Kang et al., 2022; Kezar, 2011)—often because of financial limitations, conservative values, academic resistance, competing or contradictory imperatives, and ineffective leadership (Klempin & Karp, 2018).

 

Consequences of strategic change

As research has revealed, how institutions manage strategic change may appreciably shape the experience, satisfaction, and productivity of staff.  To illustrate, a qualitative study, reported by Allen (2003), explored strategic changes in 12 tertiary education institutions in the UK.  As this study demonstrate, when information about changes was accessible to staff, staff were granted opportunities to contribute to decisions about change, and changes were incremental rather than discontinuous, staff were more likely to feel secure in their roles.  In these circumstances, staff were more likely to engage in these changes as well as embrace these changes. 

 

Approaches to implement strategic change

Universities and other tertiary education institutions have applied a variety of approaches to implement strategic change.  Despite this diversity, Navarro and Gallardo (2003) divided these approaches into three main clusters. 

 

The first set of approaches revolve around strategic planning. When institutions apply this approach, they strive to formulate a plan in which they stipulate the goals they want to reach, the activities they will initiate to reach these goals, the budget or resources they will apply to these activities, and systems of control to regulate and measure progress on these activities.  The key feature is the plan is that a bureaucratic, central body in the organization is primarily responsible to develop and to implement this strategic change. 

 

The second set of approaches primarily revolve around how the institution wants to be positioned relative to competitors. When institutions apply this approach, they primarily consider their competitive advantages and value chain as well as how they can shift their practices to exploit these benefits. They might, for example, embrace the work of Michael Porter and emphasize a market orientation over bureaucracy.    

 

The third set of approaches prioritize coordination and collaboration rather than management.  These institutions tend to introduce measures to enhance the capabilities, knowledge, and practices of individuals—ultimately to generate resources that are valuable, scarce, hard to emulate, and confined to the organization (Barney & Griffin, 1992).  Popular techniques, such as the learning organization (Quinn, 1980; Senge, 1990), knowledge management (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995), and neo-institutional perspectives (Barney & Ouchi, 1986; Milgrom & Roberts, 1993) epitomize this approach.

 

Approaches to implement strategic change: Kotter’s change model

The change model that Kotter (1995, 2007, 2008; Kotter & Cohen, 2002; see also Cohen, 2005) proposed is perhaps cited and applied more frequently than any other approach (e.g., Wentworth et al., 2018). The model comprises eight simple phases:

 

• Instil a sense of urgency in staff—a sense the change is necessary right now—to mobilize effort

• Establish a coalition or team of individuals with the skills and authority to implement the change

• Formulate a vivid and inspiring vision that depicts the aspirations the organization need to achieve, coupled with feasible, appropriate, and effective strategies or pathways to accomplish this vision

• Model the vision and communicate the vision as vividly as possible

• Identify and address obstacles that could stymie the vision, such as disadvantaged stakeholders or limited funds

• Identify and achieve some immediate and rewarding goals to foster a sense of momentum and confidence

• Introduce additional, novel measures to sustain passion and focus, because the initial sense of urgency and effort will often wane

• Embed the changes into the existing routines of staff

 

Many researchers have reported case studies in which Kotter’s change model has been utilised to implement strategic change in tertiary education institutions (Calegari et al., 2015; Kang et al., 2020; Springer et al., 2012; Wentworth et al., 2018).  To illustrate

 

• Wentworth et al. (2018) applied this change model to transform a teaching evaluation program. The researchers argued the decision to include academics on the coalition or team to guide the change was vital to the success of this intervention

• Calegari et al. (2015) applied this change model to transform the accreditation process in a business school.  The authors suggested, however, the model does not provide enough detail on how to attract the engagement and approval of academics.

• Kang et al. (2020) applied this change model to introduce a program that enables academics to assist diverse students more effectively.

 

Kang et al. (2020) reported a case study that adapted this change model to accommodate some of the unique features of tertiary education institutions.  This approach was more iterative and non-linear than Kotter’s original model.  This case study generated some key insights that institutions could utilize to adapt Kotter’s change model to universities and other tertiary education institutions.

 

• to foster a sense of urgency, the change was connected to a major grant opportunity—a language that resonates with many academics

• the coalition or team to manage the change should be reviewed and updated to accommodate the range of disciplines, fields, and priorities within each institution or department

• the vision and strategies should also be updated regularly and iteratively; academic staff often work in isolation or in small teams and, therefore, may not always formulate a shared vision effectively

• strategic changes to teaching are hard to model, because academics seldom observe each other in the classroom.  Consequently, changes may need to be introduced and communicated gradually—unlike the urgent and confined changes that are common in many businesses

• the main obstacle is that academic staff often resist change because they have developed their teaching and research practices over many years, even decades; opportunities to utilize these skills or receive significant assistance to modify these skills is thus essential

• institutions or departments can sometimes pursue minor national awards, state awards, conference awards, or other awards to achieve immediate and rewarding goals; institutional awards, in which staff can present a talk about an achievement, may also be more effective in tertiary education than business

• the templates that individuals utilize to seek promotions or recruit staff can be modified to embed these changes.

 

Approaches to implement strategic change: Long-term strategic incrementalism

One approach that scholars occasionally advocate is called long-term strategic incrementalism (e.g., Cuban, 1999; Evan & Henrichsen, 2008; Tyack & Cuban, 1995).  The crux of this approach is that change should comprise incremental refinements rather than wholesale transformations (see also Fullan, 2003).  Unfortunately, leaders in universities and other tertiary education institutions frequently overestimate their capacity to plan wholesale changes and predict the benefits of these changes.  Consequently, they may not be as receptive to approaches in which changes are introduced incrementally, reviewed frequently, and refined continuously.     

 

Long-term strategic incrementalism comprises three main phases: planning what, planning how, and translating plans into operation.  The first phase, planning what, is observed in most approaches to strategic change.  The change agents need to identify the problems to prioritize, the stakeholders who may support or oppose the change, other impediments to this change, and an inspiring vision they want to achieve. 

 

The second phase, planning how, diverges from many other approaches to strategic change.  Initially, to decide how to implement a change, the individuals need to characterize the change with reference to three dimensions:

 

• depth of the change—that is, will the change modify existing practices marginally or fundamentally

• breadth of the change—that is, does the change affect one practice or many practices

• level of the change—that is, does the change affect specific one unit, such as a school, or many units, such as the entire institution

 

This characterization of the change affects subsequent choices.  For example, if the change is fundamental or broad, rather than marginal or specific, the next activity is to identify change increments. That is, the change agents need to divide the overarching change into several discrete phases.  Individuals should identify phases in which their achievement will be satisfying and rewarding to stakeholders but are relatively simple to complete, repeat, and evaluate.

 

Once change agents delineate these increments, they should identify the forces that could facilitate or impede this increment, such as staff who benefit from the change or limitations in resources.  The change agents should then develop a strategy that amplifies the impact of forces that could facilitate the increment and diminishes the impact of forces that impede the increment.  For example, to enable staff who benefit from this change to contribute more effectively, the strategy might be to diminish the workload of these staff first.  Alternatively, to decrease the impact of limited resources, the strategy might defer the more expensive facets of this change initially until momentum is forged.  

 

This plan to change should not be too ambitious.  Consistent with research on the planning fallacy, most changes demand more time than anticipated.  Therefore, plans obviously need to accommodate these possible delays. 

 

Finally, the change agents need to implement the plan.  Specifically, they should first implement one increment to a subset of staff.  They should then evaluate this increment, adjust the plan to accommodate complications they observe, and then gradually extend this increment to other staff.  This practice in which institutions pilot, evaluate, and adapt these increments—although common in many approaches—is critical to long-term strategic incrementalism and called tinkering.

 

Most importantly, to implement the plan, the change agents need to uncover opportunities to embed the change, sometimes called stabilization.  That is, the change needs to be embedded in existing routines, such as application forms or other operations, as well as integrated with artefacts that guide the culture and priorities of staff. 

 

While implementing the plan, the change agents must remain attuned to other unforeseen opportunities.  For example, they might adjust the change—even deciding to transform a marginal change into a fundamental change.   

 

Approaches to implement strategic change: Generation of dynamic capabilities

Navarro and Gallardo (2003) developed an approach to strategic change that prioritizes two main principles and integrates two frameworks: resource-based theories (e.g., Grant, 1991) and institutional theories of organizations (e.g., Powell & Di Maggio, 1991).  The first principle revolves around the resources, capabilities, and practices of institutions.  That is, institutions must obviously be able to develop, reconfigure, and utilize these resources, capabilities, and practices.  The second principle revolves around the relationships between the institution and other stakeholders necessary to utilize these resources, capabilities, and practices.

 

This blend of principles and frameworks reduces to three key phases.  Specifically, to improve their strategy, institutions must first experiment with novel possibilities.  For example, they could

 

• identify their core and peripheral competencies—and generate projects or pursuits that utilize these competencies more effectively

• unlearn or challenge existing assumptions or practices that pervade the institution and consider alternative perspectives.

 

Second, institutions must re-order, re-arrange, re-configure, and consolidate their resources, capabilities, and practices.  To illustrate, they might

 

• acquire some additional and complementary assets to enhance their core resources, capabilities, and practice

• integrate some of the peripheral resources, capabilities, and practices to improve these assets

• enhance the degree to which their resources, capabilities, and practices are valuable, scarce, durable, and modifiable

• attempt to enhance the degree to which staff and other organizations support these resources, capabilities, and practice, such as facilitate the use or branding of these assets

 

Finally, institutions need to diffuse these resources, capabilities, and practices both across the institution and to other stakeholders.  To achieve this goal, they could

 

• reconfigure the departments within the organization in which individuals who need access to the same assets are assigned to the same departments

• reconfigure their alliances or collaborations with other organizations.

​

Phases in strategic change: Adaptive capacity before the change

Whether tertiary education institutions implement change effectively is not purely dependent on the practices they apply during the change.  Instead, to implement change effectively, these institutions must have developed specific capabilities or qualities in advance.  Collectively, these capabilities or qualities are sometimes called adaptive capacity.  Tafere Gedifew and Shimelis Muluneh (2021) reviewed the literature, administered a survey, and conducted a series of interviews with university leaders and staff to characterize the key skills, practices, or qualities that underpin this adaptive capacity.  According to this research, to develop adaptive capacity, the executives and managers need to demonstrate adaptive capacity in which they

 

• communicate an inspiring, vivid, plausible, shared, and genuine vision that depicts the goals this department or institution can achieve—rather than merely a superficial campaign or slogan

• demonstrate unwavering commitment to the institution and to this vision—in contrast to the unpredictable changes in priorities and goals that many staff observe

• can be trusted to accommodate the interests of staff and fulfill their promises—unbiased by personal and concealed agendas

• trust and empower their staff to decide how to pursue this vision

• exhibit the capability to respond effectively to changes and complications as well as to learn from these challenges

 

Second, to develop adaptive capacity, the institution needs to cultivate an adaptive culture. Specifically, this culture is characterized by

 

• innovation and creativity, in which individuals propose and embrace novel attempts to solve problems rather than confine themselves to entrenched and familiar practices

• shared responsibility and accountability, in which staff are willing to assist each other on all roles but recognize they are accountable to particular goals and targets

• shared decision making, in which staff at all levels can genuinely contribute to decisions

• staff adaptability, in which individuals tend to perceive change as an opportunity to develop rather than as a source of threat or stress.

 

Third, to foster adaptive capacity, the institution needs to mobilize enough financial resources, human resources, and technology—and decisions around resources need to be transparent and judicious, devoid of waste and redundancy.  Fourth, the institution also needs to institute effective communication practices, characterized by

 

• the capacity to convey accurate and relevant information with clarity—and to show how the change is relevant to the overall vision of this institution; too often, managers refer to the success of changes but with no tangible evidence

• the communication strategy or plan to appropriately deploy a range of communication channels—such as meetings, workshops, emails, websites, and newsletters—to convey detailed information about the purpose, timelines, and details of this change while preventing misguided and premature rumors

• information accessibility—in which relevant information is conveyed bidirectionally—both up and down the management hierarchy—as well as horizontally across every inch of the organization. 

 

Finally, to foster adaptive capacity, the institution needs to embrace systems thinking.  That is, staff need to

 

• think holistically, appreciating the institution is multifaceted and that staff in every segment may adopt a unique perspective

• understand interconnections, recognizing how all the various segments of this organization may affect one another

• develop a multidimensional perspective, in which individuals appreciate how change can affect many facets of the organization simultaneously and over time

• identify adaptive challenges, in which staff can distinguish key enduring problems to be resolved from unimportant matters

 

Phases in strategic change: Generation of ideas

Over recent decades, scholars and commentators have suggested a range of other practices that leaders should apply to implement strategic change.  To illustrate, according to Richards et al. (2004), institutions should consider scenario planning. When individuals participate in scenario planning, they strive to contemplate possible scenarios that might unfold in the future and then discuss how to accommodate these possibilities.  Typically, participants complete a series of activities.  In particular, the participants

 

• collaborate in a brain-storming session to identify the changes and events that are most likely to affect the topic of interest, such as education or research, more than 10 years in the future; the individuals typically write these changes and events on post-it notes

• rearrange these post-it notes to represent how the various changes and events, called drivers, may be related to each other; they might generate five to ten clusters of inter-related drivers

• unearth the theme that underlies each cluster; each theme will correspond to a possible scenario or situation that might unfold in the future

• integrate similar themes to generate two to three key scenarios that could transpire in the future—and then construct a narrative that describes each of these scenarios as vividly as they can

• consider the implications of each scenario, such as how the scenario might affect the institution and how to address or withstand these effects.

 

When this technique was applied to the University of Glamorgan, Richards et al. (2004) uncovered many benefits of scenario planning.  For example, scenario planning enabled staff to utilize their imagination and suggestions more extensively, generating more innovative and useful insights.  Second, scenario planning enabled staff to orient their attention to the key changes that could enhance or threaten the institution. 

 

Phases in strategic change: Evaluation of the plan

If strategic plans are not implemented effectively, most individuals will blame the change management practices. However, in some instances, the problem is not related to the change management practices but to the plan per se.  That is, in these occasions, the strategic plan did not encompass the content that is necessary to inspire change. 

 

Chance and Williams (2009) developed a rubric that leaders can utilize to evaluate and to refine their strategic plans.  For example, according to these authors, exemplary strategic plans include

 

• a rationale that justifies the importance of this plan

• an outline of the history and features of this institution that were considered during the formulation of this plan--to demonstrate an appreciation of both the strengths and constraints this organization

• a passionate and inspirational mission and vision

• strategies on how to achieve this mission and vision that are feasible, vivid, and considered

• information on who, what, where, when, and how various goals will be fulfilled to achieve these strategies

• information on how finance, governance, and administration will facilitate these goals

• a schedule and key performance indicators to manage progress on these goals

• clarity on who will implement, monitor, evaluate, and refine the plan over time

 

According to Chance and Williams (2009), this rubric could be utilised both to construct and to later evaluate or refine the strategic plan.  Nevertheless, the rubric should be adapted to suit the priorities and needs of each institution. 

​

Strategic tools and techniques: Co-creation

Management consultants have developed a range of tools and methods to facilitate strategic plans and strategic change.  Many of these tools are applied to tertiary institutions. 

 

One approach is co-creation (see Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004).  In this approach, markets are conceptualized as forums in which organizations and customers can share, combine, and refine the resources of one another.  This collaboration facilitates learning and improves services in comparison to models in which customers are conceptualized as submissive rather than active. 

 

For example, in some instances, students can access source code and thus improve products and services of a university.  Or students may be granted tools to develop advertisements for the company.  Furthermore, in other instances, students who used products in extreme conditions often stimulate ideas on how these items could be enhanced.  

 

Strategic tools and techniques: Curbing competition

Another approach to develop strategies is judo strategy (Yoffie & Kwak, 2001).   Like judo, the institution should attempt to prevent their opponents from utilizing their gamut of strengths rather than engage in direct conflict.  One of the recommendations to institution, for example, is to curb their profile initially, ensuring they do not attract undue attention from rivals.  To fulfill this goal, they could initially conceptualize their product as relevant to one market, before then entering the target market. 

 

The judo strategy has elicited many other insights. For example, according to this approach, institutions should attempt to outperform rivals on their weaknesses and not their strengths.  To illustrate, if rivals offer many features, institution should instead offer few features, highlighting the simplicity of their services.  In addition, before institution launch into a market, they should confirm they can change and augment their products rapidly, to guarantee their offers are hard to imitate.  Furthermore, institution should develop relationships with potential rivals: They might consider joint ventures or selling their products inexpensively to competitors. Institution should also attempt to exploit the attacks or initiatives of competitors.  If a rival is appealing to many students, institution should attempt to advertise in the spaces to which these students are attracted.

 

The Blue Ocean Strategy is another approach in which organizations do not attempt to outperform rivals.  Instead, institutions attempt to cultivate a unique market space, ultimately a combination of differentiation and low cost (e.g., Kim & Mauborgne, 2005).  Systematic tools, usually visual in form are applied to uncover these spaces, called blue oceans.

 

Strategic tools and techniques: Taxonomies of considerations

The five forces analysis, developed and promulgated by Porter (1979, 1980, 2008), is one of the most prevalent approaches to facilitate the development of strategies.  According to Porter (1979, 1980, 2008), five factors determine the extent to which a market is profitable and thus attractive.  These five forces comprise the bargaining power of suppliers, the bargaining power of customers or students, threat of substitute products, threat of established rivals, and threat of new entrants.

 

The bargaining power of suppliers--such as suppliers of raw materials or services--depends on many factors, including the competition amongst suppliers, the availability of substitutes, and the variation across suppliers.  The bargaining power of customers depends on the number of customers, the reliance of these customers on this market, the availability of information to customers, the diversity of industry products, and the sensitivity of customers to prices.  If suppliers or customers demonstrate a strong bargaining power, profitability of the market is likely to diminish.

 

The threat of substitute products or services depends on the extent to which these items are perceived to vary from one another as well as many other considerations.  The threat of established rivals depends on the level of advertising in the market, the competitive strategy of rivals, and other characteristics.  Finally, barriers to entry depend on the capital requirements to establish a business in this market, government policies, the time that is needed to acquire relevant knowledge, the loyalty of customers to established brands, and government policies.  If threat from substitutes and rivals is elevated, but barriers to entry are minimal, the market might not be profitable.

 

Another approach, PESTLE, is an acronym for political, economic, social, technological, legal, and environmental factors (see Gillespie, 2007).  The PESTLE analysis, often conducted as part of a SWOT analysis, is undertaken to characterize the factors in the business environment that institutions cannot influence but may affect growth.  Institutions undertake a PESTLE analysis to confirm their strategies align with the prevailing trends in the environment, to prevent unanticipated obstacles.  Usually, a PESTLE analysis is undertaken to identify the circumstances that could affect a specific initiative, such as an acquisition, product, strategy, investment, or partnership.  Practitioners identify all the relevant considerations, the consequences of these considerations, and the risk of these considerations

 

Political factors include issues such as taxation policy and impediments to trade. Economic factors include unemployment, inflation, exchange rates, and interest rates.  Social factors concern issues like the distribution of income and attitudes of employees to work.  Technological factors include rate of technological obsolescence.  Environmental factors refer to global climate and resource conservation, for example. Finally, legal issues include health and safety as well as competition and employment law.

 

Empirical determinants of strategic change

Some research has explored which features of universities, or other tertiary education institutions, affect the capacity of these institutions to implement strategic change.  For example, in one study, reported by Stensaker et al. (2014), distributed a survey to senior administrators of 26 European universities—such as rectors or senate members.  In particular, the survey first prompted the participants to indicate the extent to which various facets of the institutions were important to achieving the strategic plan.  In addition, participants indicated which of these various facets are more important now than five to ten years ago. These facets included leadership, decision making procedures, communication, a shared culture, cooperation with academics, professional staff, and students, support from government, support from external stakeholders, and evaluation. 

 

Participants tended to perceive most of these facets as important—especially leadership.  Cooperation with professional staff and support from external stakeholders were perceived as the least important.  Finally, participants felt that most of these facets, particularly leadership, communication, evaluation, and decision-making procedures are more important now than five to ten years ago   Relative to specialist and technical universities, research universities did not perceive cooperation with academics or students—or support from government or external organizations—as quite as important.   

 

Studies have validated many of these perceptions.  For example, in one study, conducted by Omuse, Kihara, and Munga (2018), senior leaders at Kenyan universities completed a questionnaire that assessed the extent to which they felt their strategic plans had been implemented effectively as well as leadership styles, communication, resources, and technology.  Leaders who promote an inspiring but realistic vision, regular communication that accommodates the values and needs of staff, and sufficient financial and human resources were all related to the successful implementation of strategic plans. 

 

The planning fallacy: The inclination to underestimate the duration of changes

To implement changes effectively, change agents need to be aware of the planning fallacy—the tendency of individuals to underestimate the duration that is needed to complete most tasks (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; for a review, see Buehler, Griffin, & Ross, 2002)—as well as practices that diminish this planning fallacy.  Otherwise, deadlines will not be reached, and a range of problems could unfold.   

 

Buehler, Griffin, and Ross (1994) published a striking example of the planning fallacy. In this study, a class of students were asked to estimate the date at which they will finish their thesis. The students actually completed their thesis, on average, in 56 days. However, they predicted they will complete their thesis in 34 days.

 

The planning fallacy: Causes

To explain the planning fallacy, some researchers assume that people inordinately orient their attention to the goal they need to achieve, neglecting key sources of information.  For example,

when they construct plans, individuals often consider the best possible outcome (Newby-Clark, Ross, Buehler, Koehler, & Griffin, 2000). They do not consider alternative possibilities. They might, therefore, underrate the likelihood of unexpected, but plausible, complications and obstacles.  Similarly, when they construct plans, individuals tend to orient their attention towards the overall task and not on the constituent acts. They will, therefore, tend to disregard some of the key actions that need to be undertaken (Kruger & Evans, 2004). Thus, when they estimate the time that might be needed to complete some task, they might disregard a few of these important acts.

 

Consistent with this possibility, after individuals focus their attention on the outcomes or benefits of some task, the planning fallacy is inflated: Individuals become even more likely to underestimate the duration that is needed to complete some task (Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 1998). Presumably, as individuals consider the outcome of some task, they become especially likely to disregard some of key facets or acts that need to be completed. In contrast, after individuals consider each constituent of a task, the planning fallacy subsides (Kruger & Evans, 2004).

 

Some motivations have been shown to amplify the planning fallacy. To illustrate, individuals are sometimes motivated to complete a task efficiently. They might, for example, receive a monetary incentive to complete a task within a confined duration. These incentives have been shown to amplify the planning fallacy—and exacerbate the inclination to divert attention from memories of previous impediments on similar tasks (Buehler, Griffin, & MacDonald, 1997)

 

The planning fallacy: Practices that amplify or decrease this bias

First, when individuals feel a sense of power—such as when granted a position of responsibility—they tend to orient their attention inordinately on the principal goals, disregarding other peripheral sources of information, such as possible complications or constituent acts.  Consequently, this sense of power tends to amplify the planning fallacy.  To illustrate, in one study, conducted by Weick and Guinote (2010), some participants were told their opinions would affect the final decision about some policy, to elicit a sense of power. Other participants were informed their opinions would not affect this decision. In addition, participants were told to estimate they time they would need to complete some assignment. If participants experienced a sense of power, they were more likely to underestimate the time that would be needed to complete some task—even after feelings of self-efficacy were controlled.

 

Second, when a project is scheduled to be completed immediately, rather than delayed, the planning fallacy often dissipates—but only if people consider the obstacles that could unfold as they estimate these durations (Peetz, Buehler, & Wilson, 2010).  That is, when events seem close, rather than distant, in time, people orient their attention to more tangible actions, such as "using a keyboard, rather than abstract goals, such as “communicating”.  Therefore, if individuals plan to complete the task soon and thus orient their attention to tangible actions or specific details, they may be more sensitive to obstacles that could unfold. 

 

Similarly, if tasks are perceived as more arduous and demanding, the planning fallacy might diminish. At least, as Jiga-Boy, Clark, and Semin (2010) highlighted, when individuals feel they need to devote considerable effort into a task, the deadline feels closer in time. The planning fallacy, therefore, could potentially abate.

 

Third, as Min and Arkes (2013) showed, if a plan is difficult to imagine vividly, the planning fallacy dissipates. That is, people tend to assume that any event that can be readily or vividly imagined is feasible and likely. Plans that cannot be readily or vividly imagined are perceived as relatively unfeasible or difficult. People assume these plans cannot be implemented rapidly, and this pessimism diminishes the planning fallacy.

 

The team scaling fallacy

In general, managers are more likely to underestimate the duration that a large team, rather than a small team, needs to complete tasks, called the team scaling fallacy (Staats, Milkman, & Fox, 2012). For example, managers could assume that a team of 4 people may complete a task in 5 days and a team of 2 people may complete the same task in 10 days. In practice, however, the team of 4 people may actually complete the task in 9 days and the team of 2 people may complete the task in 11 days.

 

Staats, Milkman, and Fox (2012) ascribe the team scaling fallacy to the inclination of people to underestimate the complications of teams. That is, when teams are large, the individuals experience several benefits: They can often specialize in the tasks they enjoy and can access more extensive knowledge. However, large teams also evoke complications. Information is not communicated as effectively. People may become unmotivated rather than assume responsibility. And conflict is more likely.  People tend to be more attuned to the benefits, instead of the drawbacks, of large teams. Therefore, they overestimate the efficiency of large teams.

 

Staats, Milkman, and Fox (2012) conducted a series of studies that demonstrate this tea scaling fallacy. For example, in one study, teams of two or four completed a LEGO task, in which they needed to construct a specific pattern. Other participants then estimated the duration that will be needed to complete this task. These estimates were unduly optimistic, especially for teams of four instead of two. A field study of software development projects also showed that estimates of the number of hours to complete a job were more optimistic when the teams were large.

 

Other fallacies that impede strategic change in tertiary education institutions

Kopp et al. (2019) has identified a range of fallacies or misconceptions that impede one variant of strategic change in tertiary education institutions: digital transformations.  For example, according to Kopp et al. (2019),

 

• leaders at many institutions erroneously assume that digital transformation is not as relevant to tertiary education as business

• leaders at many institutions erroneously assume changes should be implemented rapidly—whereas successful transformation may demand significant time to implement effectively

• leaders at many institutions erroneously assume that digital transformation should be delegated to technical specialists, whereas successful transformation demands the collaboration of individuals from many fields to optimize the process

• leaders at many institutions erroneously that older staff, unlike younger students, may not have developed the digital skills to embrace digital transformations—implying the obsolete dichotomy between digital natives and digital immigrants

• leaders at many institutions erroneously assume that digital transformation is too expensive; ultimately, these transformations will diminish expenses, although initial costs may be sizeable

 

References

• Allen, D. K. (2003). Organisational climate and strategic change in higher education: Organisational insecurity. Higher Education, 46(1), 61-92.

• Barney, J. B., & Griffin, R.W. (1992) The management of organization: strategy, structure, behavior, Boston: Houghton Miffin.

• Barney, J. B., & Ouchi, W.G. (1986). The search for new microeconomic and organization theory paradigms. In J.B. Barney and W.G. Ouchi (Eds.) Organization Economics, San Francisco: Jossey Bass.

• Boyer Commission on Educating Undergraduates in the Research University (1998). Reinventing undergraduate education: A blueprint for America’s research universities

• Buehler, R. (2007). The planning fallacy. In R. Baumeister & K. Vohs (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Social Psychology. Sage.

• Buehler, R., & Griffin, D. (2003). Planning, personality, and prediction: The role of future focus in optimistic time predictions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 92, 80-90.

• Buehler, R., Griffin, D., & MacDonald, H. (1997). The role of motivated reasoning in optimistic time predictions. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23, 238-247.

• Buehler, R., Griffin, D., & Ross, M. (1994). Exploring the "planning fallacy": Why people underestimate their task completion times. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 366-381.

• Buehler, R., Griffin, D., & Ross, M. (2002). Inside the planning fallacy: The causes and consequences of optimistic time predictions. In T. D. Gilovich, D. W. Griffin, & D. Kahneman (Eds.), Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment (pp. 250-270). New York: Cambridge University Press.

• Buehler, R., Messervey, D., & Griffin, D. (2005). Collaborative planning and prediction: Does group discussion affect optimistic biases in time estimation? Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 97, 47-63.

• Buehler, R., Peetz, J., & Griffin, D. (2010). Finishing on time: When do predictions influence completion times? Organizational Behaviour and Human Decison Processes, 111, 23-32.

• Calegari, M. F., Sibley, R. E., & Turner, M. E. (2015). A roadmap for using Kotter's organizational change model to build faculty engagement in accreditation. Academy of Educational Leadership Journal, 19(3).

• Chance, S. & Williams, B.T. (2009). Assessing university strategic plans: A tool for consideration. Educational planning: The journal of the International Society for Educational Planning, 18(1), 38-54.

• Cohen, D. S. (2005). The heart of change field guide: Tools and tactics for leading change in your organization. Harvard Business Press.

• Cuban, L. (1999). How scholars trumped teachers: Change without reform in university curriculum, teaching, and research, 1890–1990. New York, NY: Teachers College Press.

• Evans, N. & Henrichsen, L. (2008). Long-term strategic incrementalism: An approach and a model for bringing about change in higher education. Innovative Higher Education, 33(2), 111-124.

• Fullan, M. (2003). Change forces with a vengeance. London, England: Routledge Falmer.

• Gillespie, A. (2007). Foundations of economics. Oxford: Oxford University Press

• Grant, R.M. (1991). The resource-based theory of competitive advantage: Implications for strategy formulation. California Management Review, 33, 114–135.

• Holt, D., & Challis, D. (2007). From policy to practice: One university's experience of implementing strategic change through wholly online teaching and learning. Australasian Journal of Educational Technology, 23(1).

• Jalal, A., & Murray, A. (2019). Strategic planning for higher education: A novel model for a strategic planning process for higher education. Journal of Higher Education Service Science and Management (JoHESSM), 2(2).

• Jiga-Boy, G. M., Clark, A. E., & Semin, G. R. (2010). So much to do and so little time: Effort and perceived temporal distance. Psychological Science, 21, 1811-1817.

• Kahneman, D., & Lovallo, D. (1993). Timid choices and bold forecasts: A cognitive perspective on risk taking. Management Science, 39, 17-31.

• Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Intuitive predictions: Biases and corrective procedures. TIMS Studies in Management Sciences, 12, 313-327.

• Kang, S. P., Chen, Y., Svihla, V., Gallup, A., Ferris, K., & Datye, A. K. (2022). Guiding change in higher education: An emergent, iterative application of Kotter’s change model. Studies in Higher Education, 47(2), 270-289.

• Kezar, A. (2011). What is the best way to achieve broader reach of improved practices in higher education? Innovative Higher Education, 36(4), 235–247.

• Kim, R. C., & Mauborgne, R. (2005). Blue Ocean Strategy. Harvard Business School Press. 

• Klempin, S., & Karp, M. M. (2018). Leadership for transformative change: Lessons from technology-mediated reform in broad-access colleges. the Journal of Higher Education, 89(1), 81-105.

• Kopp, M., Gröblinger, O., & Adams, S. (2019). Five common assumptions that prevent digital transformation at higher education institutions. INTED2019 Proceedings, 1, 1448-1457.

• Kotter, J. P. (1995). Leading change. Harvard business review, 2(1), 1-10.

• Kotter, J. P. (2007). Leading change: Why transformation efforts fail. In Museum Management and Marketing (pp. 20-29). Routledge.

• Kotter, J. P. (2008). Force for change: How leadership differs from management. Simon and Schuster.

• Kotter, J. P., & Cohen, D. S. (2012). The heart of change: Real-life stories of how people change their organizations. Harvard Business Press.

• Kruger, J., & Evans, M. (2004). If you don't want to be late, enumerate: Unpacking reduces the planning fallacy. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40, 586-598.

• Min, K. S., & Arkes, H. R. (2013). When is difficult planning good planning? The effects of scenario-based planning on optimistic prediction bias. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 42, 2701-2729.

• Navarro, J. R., & Gallardo, F. O. (2003). A model of strategic change: Universities and dynamic capabilities. Higher education policy, 16(2), 199-212.

• Newby-Clark, I. R., Ross, M., Buehler, R., Koehler, D. J., & Griffin, D. (2000). People focus on optimistic scenarios and disregard pessimistic scenarios while predicting task completion times. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 6, 171-182.

• Nonaka, I., & Takeuchi, H. (1995) The knowledge—creating company: How Japanese companies create the dynamics of innovation, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

• Omuse, G., Kihara, P. M., & Munga, J. (2018). Determinants of strategic plan implementation in public universities: A case of selected public universities in Nairobi County, Kenya. International Academic Journal Of Human Resource And Business Administration, 3(2), 452-477.

• Peetz, J., Buehler, R., & Wilson, A. (2010). Planning for the near and distant future: How does temporal distance affect task completion predictions? Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46, 709-720.

• Prahalad, C. K., & Ramaswamy, V. (2004). The future of competition. Harvard Business School Press.

• Porter, M. E. (1979). How competitive forces shape strategy. Harvard business Review, March/April 1979. 

• Porter, M. E. (1980). Competitive strategy. Free Press: New York. 

• Porter, M. E. (2008). The five competitive forces that shape strategy. Harvard business Review, January 2008.

• Powell, W. W., & Di Maggio, P. J. (1991). the new institutionalism in organizational analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

• Powers, J. B. (2000). The use of institutional incentive grants for strategic change in higher education. The Review of Higher Education, 23(3), 281-298.

• Quinn, J.B. (1980) Strategies for change: Logical incrementalism, Boston, MA: Richard D. Irwin.

• Richards, L., O'Shea, J., & Connolly, M. (2004). Managing the concept of strategic change within a higher education institution: the role of strategic and scenario planning techniques. Strategic Change, 13(7), 345-359.

• Rowley, D. J., Lujan, H. D., & Dolence, M. G. (1997). Strategic change in colleges and universities: Planning to survive and prosper. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

• Senge, P. (1990) The fifth discipline. New York, Doubleday.

• Sidorko, P. E. (2008). Transforming library and higher education support services: can change models help? Library Management.

• Springer, P. J., Clark, C. M., Strohfus, P., & Belcheir, M. (2012). Using transformational change to improve organizational culture and climate in a school of nursing. Journal of Nursing Education, 51(2), 81-88.

• Staats, B. R., Milkman, K. L., & Fox, C. R. (2012). The team scaling fallacy: Underestimating the declining efficiency of larger teams. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 118, 132-14

• Stensaker, B., Frølich, N., Huisman, J., Waagene, E., Scordato, L., & Bótas, P. P. (2014). Factors affecting strategic change in higher education. Journal of Strategy and Management.

• Tafere Gedifew, M., & Shimelis Muluneh, G. (2021). Building a change adaptive university: A system of composite indicators to measure and facilitate pervasive changes. Higher Education Quarterly, 75(2), 227-246.

• Taylor, J. S., & de Lourdes Machado-Taylor, M. (2010). Leading strategic change in higher education: The need for a paradigm shift toward visionary leadership. In Frontiers in higher education (pp. 167-194). Brill.

• Taylor, S. E., Pham, L. B., Rivkin, I. D., & Armor, D. A. (1998). Harnessing the imagination: Mental simulation, self-regulation, and coping. American psychologist, 53(4).

• Tyack, D., & Cuban, L. (1995). Tinkering toward utopia: A century of public school reform. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

• Weick, M., & Guinote, A. (2010). How long will it take? Power biases time predictions. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46, 595-604.

• Wentworth, D. K., Behson, S. J., & Kelley, C. L. (2020). Implementing a new student evaluation of teaching system using the Kotter change model. Studies in Higher Education, 45(3), 511-523.

• Yoffie, D. M., & Kwak, M. (2001). Judo strategy: Turning your competitors' strength to your advantage. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

• Zajac, E. J., & Kraatz, M. S. (1993). A diametric forces model of strategic change: Assessing the antecedents and consequences of restructuring in the higher education industry. Strategic Management Journal, 14(S1), 83-102.