Admin Review - Optimize governance | The Model University

Introduction

Typically, one executive body—sometimes called a council, board of trustees, board of regents, or board of governors—governs tertiary education institutions. The members of these councils or boards primarily comprise lay members, individuals who are not employed by the university, besides a few senior or elected staff members and student representatives. In addition, another body—sometimes called the academic board, academic senate, academic council, faculty board, or faculty senate—mainly governs academic matters and primarily, or solely, comprises academic staff and student representatives.

Sometimes, only the council or board comprising mainly lay members is responsible to maintain the governance of this institution. The academic board or board comprising mainly academic staff is assigned an advisory role to this council. This arrangement is called a unicameral system. In other instances, the council and academic board operate in parallel. The council is primarily responsible to reach decisions around finance and strategy, whereas the academic board is primarily responsible to reach decisions around academic matters. This arrangement is called a bicameral system

Regardless, in recent decades, many scholars argue the role and contributions of academic boards have declined. Some research has been conducted to explore the impediments to academic boards and the practices that could address these impediments.

Roles of academic boards: Overview

The precise role of academic boards varies across nations. Nevertheless, in many nations

academic boards approve or advise on policies, procedures, standards, guidelines, and practices that evolve around two main activities: education and research (Dooley, 2007)
this advice does not only revolve around how to improve productivity in education and research but also how to fulfill core values, such as academic integrity and academic freedom (Dooley, 2007)
besides approval and advice, academic boards communicate the principles they adopt to stakeholders within and outside the institution as well as collate and embrace feedback and insights from these stakeholders (Dooley, 2007)

Roles of academic boards: Priorities in Australia

Some researchers have attempted to characterize the main priorities and activities of academic boards in Australia. For example, in one study, published by Vilkinas and Peters (2014), the researchers analyze the terms of reference that govern each academic board. The researchers also analyzed reports submitted by the Australian Universities Quality Agency, the precursor of the Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency, that evaluated university operations. For example, according to the terms of reference, these academic boards

communicate the academic standards of this institution to all departments
grant academics opportunities to debate academic matters
assess the quality of courses, including entry requirements, assessment, progress, and discipline
establishes standards in teaching and research and evaluates whether these standards have been fulfilled
develops, reviews, and implements academic policies and procedures
approves new courses and programs
establishes fellowships and scholarships
benchmarks practices around teaching and research

Yet, as Vilkinas and Peters (2014) revealed, the reports that Australian Universities Quality Agency submitted did not uncover evidence that academic boards were actually fulfilling these roles. This agency revealed that most of the items revolve around quality assurance, course development, or policy development. Therefore, according to these reports, academic boards seldom fulfilled some of the roles that scholars ascribe to this body—such as monitored developments in other universities or employers to enhance the profile of courses (e.g., Bradshaw & Fredette, 2009a). That is, academic boards tend to attach more weight to activities within the institution rather than outside the institution.

Roles of academic boards: Shifts over time

Some researchers and scholars maintain the role of academic boards has diminished over time. To illustrate, according to Rowlands (2011), academic boards are often swamped with responsibilities around quality assurance rather than education or research strategy.

Shattock (2013) also referred to the decline in power that academic boards enjoy, especially in Britain. To explain this decline, Shattock (2013) underscored the increasing competition that universities in Britain experience. Before 2010, a significant portion of the university budget was derived from the Higher Education Funding Councils, bodies that tended to control student numbers. The financial position of tertiary education institutions was thus more predictable. Since this time, partly because of changes in the profile and diversity of universities, many university budgets depend more on the Student Loans Company—sources of funding that are not as tightly regulated. Institutions are thus increasingly vulnerable, often prompting institutions to centralize power, purportedly to control spending.

In 2003, the Lambert Report, commissioned by the government, encouraged university governing bodies to mirror company boards and, therefore, rather than only maintain accountability also set and implement the strategy direction of these institutions. This recommendation was predicated on the belief that lay board members, rather than individuals who work at the institution, may be more able to understand the market and determine an effective strategy.

Since this time, a series of events dented confidence in the assumption that university governance should espouse the model of company boards. First, the banking crises revealed how corporate boards did not appreciate, and thus could not regulate, the multifaceted operations of their organizations—a concern that could be applied to university boards. Second, the malpractice and malfeasance that was unearthed in several universities also attested to the limitations of university governance that had adopted corporate models. Third, several reviews showed that governance bodies at universities were almost entirely reliant on the advice of executives around financial decisions, such as tuition fees and business models.

Accordingly, governance bodies are seldom apprised of alternative courses of action and thus cannot evaluate the plans of executives. One possible solution would be to increase the exchange between governance bodies and academic boards. Yet, in many instances, governance bodies that comprise few staff do not even receive the minutes of academic boards. The role of academic boards tends to. be confined to decisions about academic policies and practices. Attendance has declined. Meetings revolve around formal agenda items rather than thriving debate. Members of the executive team tend to attend and to dominate these meetings.

Challenges that academic boards experience: Overall impediments

Some research has explored the obstacles and barriers that impede the contributions of academic boards. Pennock et al. (2012), for example, conducted a study of some of the challenges and impediments that academic boards experience in Canada. Specifically, 41 secretaries of these boards—the administrator who coordinates and support this body—completed one survey about their experiences on this board. In addition, 373 members of academic boards, from 41 universities, including academics, administrators, and student representatives, completed another survey.

These surveys uncovered a range of concerns. First, many participants referred to the limited role of academic boards in matters that relate to strategy, research, finance, and fund raising. Consequently, the executives were often able to dismiss the recommendations of academic boards, alluding to financial grounds. Similarly, participants alluded to the ambiguity in the roles of this senate versus the roles of the governing board and executives. This ambiguity could exacerbate the limited role and power of academic boards.

Second, several features of these boards limited the capacity of these bodies to unearth significant insights and recommendations. Participants referred to limited debate during academic board meetings. Members often felt that most decisions are reached in other forums, implying these choices are suitable or mandatory. The large number of members on these academic boards—typically over 75 and sometimes up to 200—also precluded debate. The participants recommended that academic boards should comprise only 50 or so members. Furthermore, the limited orientation of academic board members could also diminish the confidence of these individuals to contribute to debates.

Third, participants referred to tensions between academic board and other bodies. Specifically, these participants referred to tensions between the role of academic boards and the work of relevant labor unions was broached—as well as distrust between academic boards and executive committees. Many executives, for example, felt that academics were biased by personal interests and sometimes oblivious to the broader needs of the university.

Because of these concerns, although many secretaries felt the academic boards are effective, most academics deemed these boards to be ineffective. Yet, according to participants, the academic boards could overcome some of these barriers. For example

academic boards could perhaps communicate the role and contributions more effectively to members of the board and to academics in the university more broadly—to inspire these individuals to dedicate more time and effort to assist this body
academic boards could supply more helpful information to members, enabling these individuals to reach more informed decisions or propose more informed suggestions
academic boards should evaluate their own performance more frequently, to clarify which arrangements, compositions, and policies could improve the operations of this body
academic units, such as departments, should convene meetings before academic board—to uncover issues and insights that can be presented at the forthcoming board meeting

Despite these barriers and recommendations, participants also recognized that improvements have also been introduced to Canadian academic boards since the early 2000s. For example, academic board members receive more orientation training than previously to clarify the roles and responsibilities. In addition, the number of standing committees has generally been diminished.

Challenges that academic boards experience: The role of chairs

Some research has explored the role of chairs in academic boards. In many instances, the chair is elected—sometimes by members of academic board and sometimes by other cohorts of academic staff, such as professors. The majority of universities in Australia (Rowlands, 2015), Canada (Bradshaw & Fredette, 2009), and the US (Minor, 2003), for example, adopt this approach. In other instances, the chair is selected by a specific team or individual, such as the Vice Chancellor, President, or Regent. Finally, sometimes the chair is always the person who assumes a particular role, such as Vice Chancellor or Provost. According to some researchers (Rowlands, 2015), chairs who are elected by academics, rather than executives, tend to feel they are granted more independence—that is, more right to challenge these executives.

Rowlands (2015), for example, reported several case studies to characterize this role, derived from interviews of board members, observations of board meetings, and analysis of board documents from three diverse Australian universities. In two of these cases, the chair, although elected by academics, attended the senior executive committee.

Some executives, however, questioned whether this chair should attend these executive committees, because this attendance might diminish their actual or perceived independence. The chairs also expressed this concern, not always certain when they breached their boundaries—and were sometimes castigated when expressing arguments in executive committees that transcend their role. Indeed, executive committees tend to prioritize finances as well as reputation and, therefore, may not want to prioritize the academic matters the chair of academic board raises. Hence, the academic chair may be perceived as subservient to the executives.

Similarly, the chairs were concerned that some matters, discussed or approved by the executive committee, were not delegated to academic board. That is, which matters can be regarded as academic governance, and hence germane to academic board, were contested. Some matters, for example, might partly overlap with academic priorities but primarily revolve around commercial considerations. On these matters, the executives might prefer to expedite the matter rather than consult academic board. The chair might feel obliged to serve as a proxy or representative of academic board, but seldom feel sufficiently empowered to challenge the executives (for similar perspectives in Canada, see Bradshaw & Fredette, 2009). Indeed, because many executives were academics, they may be perceived as legitimate representatives of academic needs, diminishing the significance of chairs.

Nevertheless, chairs could be influential. They were granted opportunities to speak to executives, such as vice chancellors, rectors, or presidents, and could often access information of which few other academics were aware. Yet, they were also aware this access to valuable information could be withdrawn if their behavior inspires their removal from executive committees. Consequently, chairs often felt obliged to promote the perspective of executives to the academic board. The possibility, raised by Vilkinas and Peters (2014), that chairs often report to a member of this academic board, may exacerbate this concern.

Another complication, at some universities, is the role of chairs tends to last only a limited time, such as three years. The chair, if an academic, is then expected to return to their academic role and revive their research career—often a challenging task.

Challenges that academic boards experience: Competing values and goals

One of the key challenges of governing bodies in tertiary education institutions, including academic boards, is their values and goals often conflict with each other (Vilkinas & Peters, 2014). The integrated competing values framework (Vilkinas & Cartan, 2006) depicts some of these conflicts.

This model was inspired by the competing values framework (Quinn, 1988). According to Quinn, the goals of management and governance vary along two dimensions

first, management and governance bodies can vary on the degree to which they prioritize flexibility and change over stability and predictability
second, management and governance bodies can vary on the extent to which they prioritize internal demands over external demands in the market or industry

These two dimensions can generate four main quadrants: flexible external, stable external, flexible internal, and stable internal. That is

flexible external revolves around expanding and adapting in response to changes in the market or industry
stable external revolves around maximizing outputs to accommodate the market
flexible internal revolves around committing to the development of staff
stable internal revolves around consolidating and maintaining the existing practices

Two main roles enable institutions to fulfill the goals of each quadrant. Specifically

innovators who creatively encourage change and brokers who develop networks to access knowledge and resources fulfill the flexible external quadrant
producers who motivate people to complete work tasks and directors who clarify roles and goals fulfill the stable external quadrant
facilitators who negotiate compromises and mentors who support the development of individuals fulfill the flexible internal quadrant
coordinators who enable people to solve problems collectively and monitors who distribute information and check performance fulfill the stable internal quadrant

In practice, management and governance bodies need to fulfill all these roles and thus experience conflicting demands. They need to accommodate markets and industries, epitomized by change and innovation, but also consolidate existing practices, epitomized by continuity instead. Likewise, they need to maximize outputs and thus prioritize the completion of tasks but also to develop staff and thus enable these individuals to explore unfamiliar activities.

To manage these paradoxes, the integrated competing values framework introduced an additional role—the integrator—a critical observer and reflective learner who clarifies which other roles are most significant in any circumstance. Vilkinas and Peters (2014) proposed this model characterizes some of the tensions that academic boards need to resolve as well as offers some insight around how to manage these tensions.

Potential improvements: Evaluations to enhance the efficiency of academic boards.

Academic boards comprise many academics, often at senior levels. Therefore, the costs of these meetings are steep. Consequently, chairs and members of academic boards sometimes want to ascertain whether these meetings could be convened more efficiently. To answer this question, tertiary education institutions could apply the calculations that Rogelberg et al. (2012) recommended.

This model comprises three key phases. First, institutions should estimate the costs of these meeting. That is, institutions should multiply the proportion of their time each member dedicates to these meetings, including preparation, by their salary—and then summing across members.

Second, institutions should estimate the percentage of meeting time that was useful rather than unproductive. To achieve this goal,

institutions could engage trained observers to evaluate meetings—such as evaluate the proportion of time in which the interactions were productive rather than unproductive, as defined by Kauffeld and Lehmann-Willenbrock (2012)
institutions could survey members, asking these individuals to indicate which items they felt could have been discussed outside the meeting

Institutions can then utilize these data to estimate the ineffectiveness cost. To illustrate, if the cost of meetings across a year is $1 000 000, and 20% of the meeting time is unproductive, the ineffectiveness costs is merely $1 000 000 x .2 or $500 000.

Third, the trained observers, perhaps in consultation with other specialists, should construct a report. This report should not only stipulate the percentage of time in which members engaged in the various kinds of productive interactions and unproductive interactions, but also the degree to which the meetings comply with other taxonomies of best practice, such as whether

the chair encourages opposing perspectives, but in a supportive culture
members are forewarned in advance of which issues they should prioritize in the meeting, to facilitate preparation
systematic methods are applied to identify which issues should be discussed in working groups or sub-committees
members are granted regular opportunities to communicate feedback, confidentially if necessary, about the meetings

This report can then inform a change strategy on how to optimize these meetings.

References

Bradshaw, P. (2002). Reframing board-staff relations: Exploring the governance function using a storytelling metaphor. Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 12, 471–484. doi:10.1002/nml.12409
Bradshaw, P., & Fredette, C. (2009a). Academic governance of universities: Reflections of a Senate Chair on moving from theory to practice and back. Journal of Management Inquiry, 18, 123–133.
Bradshaw, P., & Fredette, C. (2009b). Theory to practice in academic governance: Not the last word. Journal of Management Inquiry, 18, 142–143. doi:10.1177/1056492608326328
Carnegie, G.D., & Tuck, J. (2010). Understanding the ABC of university governance. The Australian Journal of Public Administration, 69, 431–441
Dooley, A.H. (2007). Thematic analysis: The role of academic boards in university governance. Australian Universities Quality Agency
Kauffeld, S., & Lehmann-Willenbrock, N. (2012). Meetings matter: Effects of team meetings on team and organizational success. Small Group Research, 43(2), 130-158.
Minor, J. T. (2003). Assessing the senate: Critical issues considered. American Behavioral Scientist, 46, 960–977.
Pennock, L., Jones, G. A., Leclerc, J. M., & Li, S. X. (2012, September). Academic senates and university governance in Canada: Changes in structure and perceptions of senate members. In annual meeting of the Consortium of Higher Education Researchers, Belgrade, Serbia.
Quinn, R. (1988) Beyond rational management: Mastering the paradoxes and competing demands of high performance. Jossey‐Bass, San Francisco, CA.
Rogelberg, S. G., Shanock, L. R., & Scott, C. W. (2012). Wasted time and money in meetings: Increasing return on investment. Small Group Research, 43(2), 236-245.
Rowlands, J. (2012). Accountability, quality assurance and performativity: The changing role of the academic board. Quality in Higher Education, 18, 97–110
Rowlands, J. (2013). Academic boards: less intellectual and more academic capital in higher education governance? Studies in Higher Education, 38(9), 1274-1289.
Rowlands, J. (2015). Present but not counted: The tenuous position of academic board chairs within contemporary university governance. International Journal of Leadership in Education, 18(3), 263-278.
Rowlands, J. (2017). Changes in the case study academic boards over time. In Academic Governance in the Contemporary University (pp. 131-145). Springer, Singapore.
Rowlands, J. (2018). Deepening understandings of Bourdieu’s academic and intellectual capital through a study of academic voice within academic governance. Studies in Higher Education, 43(11), 1823-1836.
Shattock, M. (2012). University governance: An issue for our time. Perspectives: Policy and Practice in Higher Education,
Shattock, M. (2013). University governance, leadership and management in a decade of diversification and uncertainty. Higher Education Quarterly, 67(3), 217-233.
Vilkinas, T., & Cartan, G. (2006). The integrated competing values framework: Its spatial configuration. Journal of Management Development.
Vilkinas, T., & Peters, M. (2014). Academic governance provided by academic boards within the Australian higher education sector. Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management, 36(1), 15-28.

Return to top

Return to menu

Remuneration of Vice Chancellors, Rectors, and Presidents

Introduction: Increases in the remuneration of University CEOs

Many studies reveal that, over the last few decades, the remuneration of university CEOs—called Vice Chancellors, Presidents, or Rectors—have increased substantially. This trend has materialized in many nations, including the UK (Heffernan, 2019), Australia (Heffernan, 2019), Canada (Essaji & Horton, 2009), and Denmark (Boden & Wright, 2010). To illustrate, as Boden and Rowlands (2022) reported,

at one elite Australian university, the Vice Chancellor earned 2.9 times the lowest academic salary in 1975, 6.3 times the lowest academic salary in 1995, and 16 times the lowest academic salary in 2018
although not as pronounced, a similar pattern was observed in a moderately strong Australian university
similar patterns have also emerged in the UK

Responses to this increase in the remuneration of university CEOs, relative to other academics, are diverse. Some commentators believe these increases are unjustified and unjust—especially at a time when other staff are grappling to pay their bills. Even some politicians criticize these generous salary packages (e.g., Morgan, 2017). Other commentators believe these increases are justifiable, or even inadequate, because the role of university CEOs has become increasingly complicated. Because of this controversy, many researchers have explored the determinants of these changes in the remuneration of university CEOs

Causes of the increase in the remuneration of university CEOs: The skimming hypothesis

Arguably, the skimming hypothesis could, at least partly, explain the pronounced increase in the remuneration of University CEOs. According to this hypothesis, university CEOs can exploit a range of opportunities to increase their remuneration. For example, they might lobby the remuneration committee. In practice, however, three main forces limit the capacity of these university CEOs to exploit these opportunities:

the board, such as the university council, may not approve this increase in remuneration
other stakeholders, such as government staff, university staff, or students, may raise concerns about this increase
the general public may also raise concerns if the increase deviates from social norms

However, according to the skimming hypothesis, in specific circumstances, these forces may dwindle, and the attempt of University CEOs to increase their remuneration may persist unabated. To illustrate

during times in which budgets are not as tight, the board of directors may not be as sensitive to costs and, therefore, may be more inclined to overlook increases in the remuneration of university CEOs
during times in which tuition fees escalate, students are more likely to protest increases in the remuneration of university CEOs; during other times, students may not be as sensitive to the remuneration of university CEOs
because universities now seem to operate like businesses, the general public might assume that university CEOs should be paid a comparable amount to corporate CEOs

Certainly, research in other sectors corroborate the skimming hypothesis. For instance, when oil prices rise, and the profits of oil companies increases, the CEOs of these companies receive significantly greater remuneration (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001). Yet, this increase in the oil price and profit cannot be ascribed to the decisions or behaviors of a particular CEO. The CEO should not be rewarded because of a change they did not elicit. Presumably, as the oil price increases and both profits and share prices mount, scrutiny of these companies diminishes. The various attempts of the CEO to increase their remuneration are not as likely to be thwarted.

The skimming hypothesis is hard to test definitively in the university sector. Nevertheless, some of the increases in the remuneration of university CEOs coincide with events that might have diminished the forces that constrain CEO remuneration. For example, in Canada, during the 2000s, the tuition fees of students have remained steady—decreasing the likelihood that students will be attuned to the remuneration of university executives (Essaji & Horton, 2009). At the same time, the remuneration of university CEOs increased sharply.

The impact of an Australian government agency, called the Academic Salaries Tribunal, also corroborates the skimming hypothesis (for a discussion, see Boden & Rowlands, 2022). Between 1974 and 1986, the Academic Salaries Tribunal set the salaries of academic staff in the nation. During most of this time, the Academic Salaries Tribunal also specified the recommended salary of Vice Chancellors—shaped by comparisons with other comparable industries. This tribunal tended to recommend higher remuneration to the Vice Chancellors of elite universities than to the Vice Chancellors of other Australian universities.

At this time, universities could pay Vice Chancellors an amount that diverged from these recommendations. However, if this remuneration exceeded the recommendation, the federal government indicated they would deduct this amount from the grants they paid these universities.

As Boden and Rowlands (2022) revealed, once the Academic Salaries Tribunal was dismantled, the remuneration of university CEOs, relative to other academics, escalated markedly. This pattern is consistent with the skimming hypothesis. Arguably, the recommendations, emanating from the Academic Salaries Tribunal, enabled boards of directors to ascertain whether the remuneration of university CEOs was reasonable. They could more readily identify excessive remuneration. Once this body dissolved, this capacity of boards of directors to recognize and prevent these excesses may have waned.

An overlapping but distinct account, the theory of managerial power (see Bachan & Reilly, 2015), may also explain increases in the remuneration of university CEOs. According to this theory, in some circumstances, university CEOs are granted significant opportunity to influence their pay. Whereas the skimming hypothesis is primarily oriented around the measures that can limit this influence, the theory of managerial power is more oriented around the opportunities that CEOs can exploit to shape decisions around pay.

To demonstrate, in many nations, a remuneration committee—usually a subcommittee of the university council or board—sets the remuneration of university CEOs as well as other executives. Yet, as Boden and Rowlands (2022) underscored, in over half the universities in Australia, and 95% of universities in the UK, the Vice Chancellor was either a member of these committees or granted the right to attend these committees and contribute to debates. Accordingly, university CEOs can readily, either explicitly or obliquely, exert pressure on these committees to increase their remuneration.

Causes of the increase in the remuneration of university CEOs: Benchmarking

Some boards may not only fail to contain the attempts of university CEOs to increase their remuneration but may themselves initiate actions that amplify this pay. One example revolves around the notion of benchmarking. That is, according to Gschwandtner and McManus (2018), remuneration committees often need to decide whether to change the remuneration of university CEOs. To some extent, the remuneration of CEOs at other comparable universities will shape these decisions, called benchmarking. This approach, however, may culminate in an unforeseen consequence.

Specifically, if the remuneration committee discover the existing remuneration of their CEO is lower than average, they will tend to increase this remuneration. However, if the remuneration committee discover the existing remuneration of their CEO is higher than average, they may feel reluctant to decrease this remuneration for various reasons. They might, for instance, be concerned this decrease signals the university is experiencing challenges. Therefore, if remuneration committees apply this benchmarking approach, remuneration will tend to increase when aggregated across universities.

The data that Gschwandtner and McManus (2018) analyzed tends to corroborate this possibility. Specifically, these researchers analyzed a dataset, derived from 154 UK universities over 10 years. The data included the remuneration of university Vice Chancellors as well as measures of performance, such as the number of students in the institution, student evaluations, research performance, and research income.

Improvements in performance one year were not significantly related to increases in Vice Chancellor remuneration the next year. Thus, increases in remuneration could not be ascribed to improvements in performance. However, remuneration of Vice Chancellors was more likely to increase if this remuneration was lower than average than if the remuneration was higher than average—consistent with benchmarking.

Causes of the increase in the remuneration of University CEOs: Increased demand

Increases in the remuneration of University CEOs may not always be ascribed to skimming or benchmarking. Instead, classic economic theory, such as the balance of supply and demand, could also explain some of this increase. To illustrate, one possibility is that, in some periods, universities cannot readily attract and recruit individuals who could be suitable CEOs. That is, the demand to recruit CEOs might exceed the available supply of qualified individuals.

Whether excessive demand can explain the increase in remuneration of university CEOs is hard to assess. Nevertheless, this effect of excessive demand could explain some interesting patterns of remuneration data, observed in Canada during the 2000s. As Essaji and Horton (2009) underscored

around this time, the remuneration of university executives tended to increase by a similar extent in different states, such as Alberta, Manitoba, and Ontario
yet, the size and financial position of universities was lower in Ontario
the size and financial position of universities does not affect the capacity to recruit executives
therefore, if the capacity to recruit executives diminished in all three states, the remuneration of university executives should increase in all three states, regardless of variations in size and financial position—consistent with the results

Indeed, the capacity to recruit executives is likely to be similar in these states. Executives are often willing to shift between states. Consequently, if the demand is high in one state, demand is likely to be high in the other states as well.

Causes of the increase in the remuneration of university CEOs: Increases in marginal utility

Some theories, such as the skimming hypothesis, imply the increased remuneration of University CEOs is unjustified. That is, according to these accounts, University CEOs are earning more but not delivering more to the institution. One alternative, however, is the increased remuneration is justified. That is, this increase may be proportional to the greater marginal value these individuals contribute to the university—sometimes called marginal product theory (e.g., Johnes & Virmani, 2020).

Indeed, several changes, over recent decades, have complicated the role of university CEOs. Many responsibilities, such as fundraising, lobbying, and restructuring, have become increasingly significant. The universities they lead have become increasingly diverse. Therefore, the increased remuneration of university CEOs may be justifiable.

In practice, however, researchers cannot readily measure the degree to which the role is complicated. Therefore, they cannot ascertain whether the increased remuneration of University CEOs coincides with changes to their role. Nevertheless, the degree to which a role is complicated is closely associated with the size of a university. Researchers have thus explored whether the size of a university—a proxy measure of whether the role is complicated—is associated with remuneration to CEOs.

In general, this research has revealed that increases in university size tend to coincide, at least moderately, with rises in remuneration of University CEOs. The magnitude of this association, however, varies considerably across universities (e.g., Essaji & Horton, 2009). Taken together, these findings imply that increases in the remuneration of University CEOs could partly, but not entirely, be ascribed to the greater range of responsibilities these individuals must fulfill (Essaji & Horton, 2009).

Causes of the increase in the remuneration of university CEOs: Tournament theory

Many commentators assume that staff tend to perceive generous remuneration of University CEOs unfavorably. According to tournament theory (Rosen, 1986; see also Bachan & Reilly, 2015), however, generous remuneration of University CEOs could benefit staff. Specifically, as this theory assumes, many staff do not feel motivated to work vigorously. Instead, they like to conserve, rather than to exert, effort. However, if the next position in the hierarchy is paid appreciably more, these staff may feel more inspired to work vigorously, ultimately to secure a promotion and a pay rise. Consequently, to motivate staff, remuneration committees often magnify the disparity in pay between consecutive levels of management. So

the remuneration of university CEOs will be appreciably greater than is the remuneration of provosts
the remuneration of provosts will be appreciably greater than is the remuneration of deans and so forth.

One interesting corollary of this theory is that forces that increase the remuneration of one level of management, such as deans or directors, will tend to increase the remuneration of university CEOs as well. For example

if universities cannot readily attract deans, the remuneration of deans might increase
consequently, the remuneration of provosts and university CEOs will also increase—not because of limited candidates but to maintain enough disparity in pay between the levels of management

As Bachan and Reilly (2015) revealed, tournament theory can explain some of the increase in the remuneration of university CEOs in recent decades. These researchers collated data from 95 UK universities between 1998 and 2009. The data included the remuneration of Vice Chancellors, the age of these individuals, the proportion of staff earning more than 70 000 pounds, and various measures of performance—such as tuition fees, research income, and the degree to which the university fulfilled targets around admission of students from disadvantaged communities. Consistent with tournament theory, in universities in which many staff earned more than 70 000 pounds, the remuneration of Vice Chancellors was higher. That is, elevated income at one level tended to coincide with elevated income at another level, arguably to maintain enough disparity between these levels.

However, as the results showed, tournament theory does not explain all increases in Vice Chancellor remuneration over time. For example, improvements in performance one year—such as increases in tuition fees, research income, and the degree to which the university fulfilled targets around admission of students from disadvantaged communities—tended to predict increases in Vice Chancellor remuneration the next year to a moderate extent. So, the apparent performance of university CEOs does influence the subsequent remuneration.

Causes of the increase in the remuneration of university CEOs: Agency theory

The finding that performance one year may affect the remuneration of university CEOs the next year is consistent with agency theory. Consistent with agency theory (Balago, 2014; Kivistö, 2008), specific individuals or bodies, such as the government or director of the board, experience an interest in the success of this university. These individuals or bodies, called principals, must depend on the executives, and particularly the CEO, to achieve this success. However, these principals cannot readily monitor or evaluate these CEOs. They cannot, therefore, trust whether the CEOs will initiate the changes that are necessary to enhance the institution.

Fortunately, if the motivations of both the principals and CEO match, this problem dissipates. To cultivate this match, the principals may pay the CEO an attractive bonus if the institution performs effectively, such as raises more tuition fees and attracts more research income. Under these circumstances, both the principal and the CEO will be motivated to improve the institution. Their motivations will thus match.

Agency theory, therefore, predicts that remuneration of university CEOs should significantly depend on the performance of their institutions the previous year. Some research has shown that performance one year, such as tuition fees, research income, or university rankings, is positively related to remuneration of university CEOs the next year (e.g., Bachan & Reilly, 2015; Johnes & Virmani, 2020). Yet, these associations tend to be modest and do not explain all the variation in CEO remuneration.

References

Adams, R. (2019). Vice-chancellors still attend pay meetings despite outcry. The Guardian.
Adams, R., & Gamperl, E. (2018). University vice-chancellors are paid far more than public sector peers. The Guardian.
Bachan, R., & Reilly, B. (2015). Is vice chancellor pay justified by university performance? Fiscal Studies, 36(1), 51–73.
Baimbridge, M., & Simpson, C. (1996). Rewards to academia: The remuneration of vice chancellors and principals. Applied Economics, 28(6), 631–639.
Balago, G. S. (2014). A conceptual review of agency models of performance evaluation. International Journal of Finance and Accounting, 3(4), 244–252.
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2001). Are CEOs rewarded for luck? The ones without principals are. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(3), 901–932
Blanchflower, D. (2017). University vice-chancellors deserve more pay not less. The Guardian.
Boden, R., & Rowlands, J. (2022). Paying the piper: the governance of vice-chancellors’ remuneration in Australian and UK universities. Higher Education Research & Development, 41(2), 254-268.
Boden, R., & Wright, S. (2010). Follow the money: An interim report on Danish university funding. Aarhus University.
Cheng, S. (2014). Executive compensation in public higher education: Does performance matter? Research in Higher Education, 55(6), 581–600.
Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D., & Donaldson, L. (1997). Toward a stewardship theory of management. The Academy of Management Review, 22(10), 20–47.
DiPrete, T. A., Eirich, G. M., & Pittinsky, M. (2010). Compensation benchmarking, leapfrogs, and the surge in executive pay. American Journal of Sociology, 115(6), 1671–1712.
Dodd, T. (2017, May 1). Simon Birmingham attacks university vice-chancellors’ $1 m salaries. The Australian Financial Review.
Essaji, A., & Horton, S. (2009). Silent escalation: Salaries of senior university administrators in Ontario, 1996–2006. Higher Education, 59(3), 303–322.
Gritsko, N., Kozlova, V., Neilson, W., & Wichmann, B. (2013). The CEO arms race. Southern Economic Journal, 79(3), 586–599.
Gschwandtner, A., & McManus, R. (2018). University vice-chancellor pay, performance and (asymmetric) benchmarking
Heffernan, T. A. (2019). Reporting on vice-chancellor salaries in Australia’s and the United Kingdom’s media in the wake of strikes, cuts and ‘falling performance’. International Journal of Leadership in Education.
Hubble, S., & Bolton, P. (2018). ‘Vice Chancellors’ pay in higher education institutions in England’, House of Commons Library Briefing paper 8227. House of Commons.
Johnes, J., & Virmani, S. (2020). Chief executive pay in UK higher education: The role of university performance. Annals of Operations Research, 288(2), 547–576.
Kivistö, J. (2008). An assessment of agency theory as a framework for the government–university relationship. Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management, 30(4), 339–350.
Kniest, P. (2017). Australian universities top world rankings … for VC pay. Journal of the National Tertiary Education Union, 24(1), 18–19.
Langford, S. (2018). Australian uni bosses are paid obscenely high salaries for no good reason. Junkee Media
Lazear, E. P., & Rosen, S. (1981). Rank order tournaments as optimum labor contracts. The Journal of Political Economy, 89(5), 841–864.
Loussikian, K. (2018, August 27). The nation’s highest paid university leaders. The Sydney Morning Herald
Morgan, J. (2017). Andrew Adonis attacks ‘greed’ of £450 k Bath v-c. Times Higher Education, July 14th.
Neokleous, I. C. (2015). Executive compensation as a corporate governance problem. Essex Student Research Online, 7(1), 27–41.
Rosen, S. (1986). Prizes and incentives in elimination tournaments. American Economic Review, 76, 701-715.
Tarbert, H., Tee, K., & Watson, R. (2008). The legitimacy of pay and performance comparisons: An analysis of UK University Vice Chancellors pay awards. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 46(4), 771–805.

Return to top

Return to menu

Whistle blowing in tertiary education institutions

Introduction

Most tertiary education institutions have developed policies and procedures around whistleblowing. These documents purportedly encourage and enable staff to report wrongdoing to the relevant authorities. However, many individual characteristics, workplace practices, and other circumstances affect whether staff will actually comply with these policies or procedures.

For example, because of various barriers, such as concerns about retaliation and limited support around whistleblowing, staff are often reluctant to report wrongdoing. To illustrate, staff may be concerned that, after they report wrongdoing, they may experience a range of problems. For example, their performance may be evaluated harshly or their requests around pay and conditions may be refused. They may be harassed by other staff, transferred to undesirable jobs, and unable to secure work elsewhere (Curtis, 2006)—despite provisions that are intended to prevent reprisals. Even practices that seem unrelated to whistleblowing, such as the extent to which leaders promulgate an inspiring vision of the future, can affect the inclination of staff to report wrongdoing.

As Olesen et al. (2019) revealed, concerns about reprisal are not the only barriers to whistle blowing. For example, as their interviews of 21 researchers from 8 Malaysian universities revealed, staff were reluctant to report violations of research integrity, not only because they did not feel protected from reprisal, but also because they were concerned the investigation would be prolonged and taxing. In addition, their cultural values had inculcated the compulsion to shun conflict as well as to respect authority, norms that impeded their willingness to disclose research misconduct.

Whistleblowing is a significant topic to all sectors. However, in tertiary education, whistleblowing raises some distinct issues, because the matters tend to concern diverse stakeholders and the broader public (Chaudhary, Gupta, et al., 2019).

Introduction: Typical policies and procedures

Although these policies and procedures vary across institutions and nations, some provisions are common if not universal. For example, most policies stipulate that

staff can report wrongdoing, based on reasonable grounds, that fulfills specific criteria, such as misconduct, illegal behavior, harassment, or a breach of the codes or policies of the institution
the policy should not supersede the usual communication between staff and their supervisors
particular individuals—such as the executives of this institution, the directors of risk, security, or human resources, internal auditors, or members of the university board—are authorized to receive these reports of wrongdoing
some reports are deemed as protected by law—and these reports must be distributed to the relevant government authorities, such as the state corruption body or tax office, and follow specific guidelines
only in very specific circumstances can staff disclose wrongdoing to members of parliament, journalists, or lawyers outside the university
usually, the identity of staff who report protected wrongdoings should remain confidential; if practical, the identity of staff who report other wrongdoings should also remain confidential
the identity of staff who reported the wrongdoings may be disclosed if these staff consent or if this disclosure is necessary to achieve natural justice or investigate the matter
the staff who report wrongdoings and staff involved in the investigation or process may not disclose information about this matter to anyone who is not involved in the process
staff who report protected wrongdoings, based on reasonable grounds, must be protected from reprisal

Separate procedures tend to specify how staff should report these matters, the responses of officers who receive the report, how the reports should be investigated, how investigations should be communicated to all parties, and how reprisals should be prevented and managed.

Determinants of whistleblowing intention in tertiary education: Characteristics of the institutions

Despite these policies and procedures, many staff express a reluctance to report wrongdoing (e.g., Chaudhary, Gupta, et al., 2019; Iko Afe et al., 2019). Various characteristics and attributes of tertiary education institutions may influence the likelihood that staff will report this wrongdoing. For example, in one study, conducted by Iko Afe et al (2019), staff at Selçuk University in Turkey completed surveys that assessed the degree to which they would be willing to report wrongdoing to the relevant authorities as well as their perceptions of the climate and practices of the institution. The data revealed some interesting patterns. For example

if the institution was perceived as fair and just—and the leaders were perceived as credible and trustworthy—staff were, unsurprisingly more likely to report wrongdoings informally
however, if the morale of this institution was high, staff were actually less inclined to report wrongdoings informally
in addition, if staff felt they were granted autonomy, these individuals were less inclined to report wrongdoings formally and officially.

One explanation of these findings revolves around the motivation of staff to change the institution. If staff are satisfied with the organization and enjoy a sense of autonomy, they may not always be as motivated to change the organization. In contrast, if staff are dissatisfied with the organization and feel their autonomy is impeded, they feel a sense of compulsion to change and to improve the organization. They might perceive reporting wrongdoing, such as misconduct, intimidation, and other unsuitable behavior, as an opportunity to improve the organization. This argument implies that

unfavorable features of an organization can sometimes increase the willingness of staff to report wrongdoing, because they feel compelled to transform the environment
unfavorable features of an organization can sometimes diminish the willingness of staff to report wrongdoing, because these individuals might not trust the response to this report will be adequate or safe.

Determinants of whistleblowing intention in tertiary education: Communication channels

In some institutions, staff are uncertain about how to report wrongdoing. For example, the procedures on how to report wrongdoing might not have been promoted effectively or may be ambiguous. Alternatively, staff may be aware that colleagues seldom follow workplace procedures—and hence tend to dismiss the official policies. Chaudhary, Gupta, et al. (2019) explored whether uncertainty about how to communicate wrongdoings affect how staff respond when they observe these behaviors.

To examine this matter, 80 teachers from two universities and 20 teachers from ten colleges in India completed a questionnaire. The questionnaire included measures that assess workplace perceptions as well as scenarios that depict instances in which they observe instances of wrongdoing. Participants indicated how they would respond in these scenarios.

As hypothesized, if teaching staff were uncertain about how to report wrongdoing, they were, unsurprisingly, not as inclined to report wrongdoing to authorized individuals in the institution. However, this uncertainty did not affect whether they reported wellbeing to authorized individuals outside the institution. The implication of this finding is vital: If institutions do not introduce the channels to encourage disclosure of wrongdoing, staff may instead report this wrongdoing to authorities outside the organization, potentially compromising the reputation of this workplace.

Yet, teaching staff are sensitive to the possibility that whistle blowing outside the institution might impair the reputation of this organization. To illustrate, as Chaudhary, Gupta, et al. (2019) revealed, teaching staff were more inclined to report serious offences, rather moderate or mild offences, to authorized individuals within the institution—perhaps to protect this reputation.

To clarify the motivations of teaching staff, Chaudhary, Phoolka, et al. (2019) also interviewed 25 teachers in higher education within India. Teaching staff felt that whistleblowing should be encouraged more to limit wrongdoing and to ultimately improve the reputation of their institution. The teaching staff felt more inspired to report wrongdoing if they were optimistic the workplace could improve in response to their actions, their reputation would be preserved, the reputation of their organization would be preserved, and they felt a personal sense of responsibility to serve their organization and society. These results imply that institutions must introduce tangible, sustainable, and genuine changes in response to complaints or reports of wrongdoing—to demonstrate their capacity to change.

Determinants of whistleblowing intention in tertiary education: Individual characteristics

As some research indicates, the individual characteristics of staff, such as their social-demographic details, their personality, and their beliefs might also impinge on the inclination of these individuals. According to the theory of planned behavior, the degree to which staff intend to report wrongdoing should depend on

their personal attitudes towards whistleblowing, such as whether they believe that whistleblowing is likely to benefit themselves, their organization, and their society
social norms about whistleblowing, such as whether they believe their colleagues would also report wrongdoing, and
perceived behavioral control, such as whether they feel they could report wrongdoing efficiently

To assess this possibility in the tertiary education sector, in one study that Hidayah et al. (2019) reported, 123 staff members at Semarang State University in Java completed a questionnaire. As structural equation modeling revealed, personal attitudes towards whistleblowing and social norms about whistleblowing, but not perceived behavioral control, were positively associated with the intention or willingness to report wrongdoings. In contrast, in other sectors, studies tend to show that perceived behavioral control is positively related to the intention or willingness to report wrongdoings (e.g., Rustiarini et al., 2017; for a review, see Nicholls et al., 2021).

Determinants of whistleblowing outside tertiary education: Individual characteristics

Many studies, outside the tertiary education sector, have explored individual characteristics that affect the inclination of staff to report wrongdoing. This literature could be useful to tertiary education institutions as well, imparting some insight into which staff should be the targets of campaigns to encourage whistleblowing. Although some of the results are conflicting, studies have often shown that

older staff, with greater understanding of how to navigate their organization, are more inclined to report wrongdoing (Sims & Keenan, 1998; Keenan, 2000)
educated individuals are more inclined to report wrongdoing (Cho, & Song, 2015; Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Sims & Keenan, 1998)
individuals who have worked at the organization over many years are more likely to report wrongdoing (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005)

Taken together, as these findings suggest, some staff, because of experience or seniority, feel more able to navigate their organization and thus report wrongdoing. Staff who feel disempowered, thus, may be less inclined to report wrongdoing.

Nevertheless, as Nicholls et al. (2021) underscored, after they conducted a systematic review into the determinants of whistleblowing intentions, the association between some individual characteristics and the reluctance to report wrongdoing varies across studies. To illustrate, five studies revealed that women are more inclined to report wrongdoing than men, because perhaps female staff may be more attuned to some of the moral dimensions of these matters. Other studies revealed that men are more inclined to report wrongdoing than women, perhaps because male staff may be more likely to feel empowered in their role. Researchers have not clarified the cause of this discrepancy across studies.

Even the association between level of seniority and their inclination to report wrongdoing has generating either conflicting or complicated patterns. For example, studies that have explored whether senior managers are more likely to report wrongdoing than middle managers or supervisors have generated conflicting results (Nicholls et al., 2021)

To some extent, the effects of these demographics on whistleblowing intentions depends on their moral beliefs. People who prioritize moral principles when they reach decisions as well as reason effectively when they reach ethical decisions are more likely to report wrongdoing (e.g., Latan et al., 2019; Xu & Ziegenfuss, 2008).

Researchers have also examined whether more entrenched personality traits affect the inclination to report wrongdoing. For instance, the systematic review, conducted by Nicholls et al. (2021), revealed that

risk aversion and Machiavellianism were inversely associated with the inclination to report wrongdoing
individuals who feel that other people or luck determines their success, called an external locus of control, were also not as inclined to report wrongdoing
in contrast, the tendency to be honest and humble was positively associated with the inclination to report wrongdoing

Determinants of whistleblowing outside tertiary education: Characteristics of the organization

Many characteristics and attributes of organizations as well as policies, procedures, and practices also influence the degree to which staff are willing to report wrongdoing. Indeed, studies indicate that, in general, characteristics of workplaces explain more variance than do characteristics of individuals in this willingness to report (Near & Miceli, 1996).

For example, organizations differ on ethical climate—that is, how managers tend to reach ethical decisions. Specifically, when reaching decisions about ethical matters, such as whether to report wrongdoing that might damage the career prospects of a colleague, individuals in the organization may prioritize

the tangible outcomes to either themselves or their organization, such as personal rewards or company profits, called an egoistic ethical climate
social relationships, such as personal friendships or team cohesion, called a benevolent ethical climate
ethical principles, codes, or rules, called a principled ethical climate

As Ahmad et al. (2014) revealed, from a survey of internal auditors throughout Malaysia, a principled ethical climate was positively associated with the inclination of these auditors to report wrongdoing—as gauged from their responses to several fictional scenarios. Therefore, in organizations in which managers often refer to broader principles, rather than personal interest, company profit, or social relationships, to justify decisions, wrongdoing may be more likely to be reported.

Although this emphasis on principles, rather than relationships, encourage individuals to report wrongdoing, the degree to which staff feel the organization strives to enhance their wellbeing and satisfaction—called perceived organizational support—also influences their inclination to report. In one study that Kamarunzaman et al. (2014) published, 509 employees of one Malaysian organization completed a questionnaire that assessed their perceptions of their workplace and the likelihood they would report wrongdoing. The individuals who felt the organization values their wellbeing and satisfaction were more inclined to report wrongdoing. Presumably, when staff perceive the organization as supportive, they trust the workplace will manage attempts to report wrongdoing appropriately. They also tend to feel obliged to support their workplace to reciprocate the support they receive.

In addition to support from the organization, support from peers also inspires staff to report wrongdoing. That is, as many studies reveal, when staff perceive their peers and colleagues as supportive and encouraging, they are not as reluctant to report wrongdoing (Alleyne et al., 2018; Latan et al., 2018; Tumuramye et al., 2018)). This support may instill a sense of resilience and thus a belief they can withstand reprisal.

However, in this study, the degree to which staff were aware of the channels to communicate or disclose this wrongdoing was the main determinant of their inclination to report (Kamarunzaman et al., 2014). If staff feel a sense of uncertainty about how to report wrongdoing—perhaps because the procedures have not been promoted effectively, the procedures are ambiguous, or the procedures are seldom observed anyway—they are obviously more likely to disregard, rather than to report, instances of wrongdoing they observe.

Besides channels of communication, the communication of leaders in particular also influence whether staff will report wrongdoing. For example, when leaders are transformational—and espouse as well as model an inspiring vision of the future and encourage individuals to explore innovative opportunities to fulfill this vision—staff are more willing to disclose wrongdoing (Caillier, 2013). Presumably, these staff feel inspired to improve the organization.

Similarly, if leaders are authentic, in which they pursue strong ethical values, acknowledge their limitations honestly, and communicate openly, staff are also inclined to report wrongdoing (Liu et al., 2015). These staff are more likely to trust these leaders will respond appropriately to these disclosures. That is, when leaders are authentic and acknowledge their genuine interests and concerns, staff might feel a sense of connection to these individuals. This sense of connection or similarity might promote trust. Conversely, as studies reveal, dissimilarities between leaders and staff do tend to diminish the inclination of these staff to report wrongdoing (Park & Keil, 2009)

Yet, a laissez-faire style, in which leaders seem relatively detached from the work of their team, also promotes whistle blowing (Erturk & Donmez, 2016). Conceivably, when leaders adopt this laissez-faire style, staff are not as concerned about reprisal. Alternatively, these staff might feel they need to behave proactively rather than relinquish control to this laissez-faire leader.

Determinants of whistleblowing outside tertiary education: Characteristics of the job

Characteristics of the job, rather than organization and leadership, also affect the likelihood that staff will report wrongdoing. To illustrate, when individuals feel secure in their job (Shawver, 2008), they are more inclined to report wrongdoing. Presumably, if their job is secure, individuals are not as inclined to consider the possibility that action might jeopardize this job—a feeling that tends to impede reporting (Alleyne, 2016). Conversely, if managers evaluate the performance of their staff unfavorably, these staff are reluctant to report wrongdoing, presumably because they might not feel as secure in their jobs (Miceli et al., 1991; but for conflicting findings, see Robertson et al., 2011)

Determinants of whistleblowing outside tertiary education: Features of the wrongdoing

The features of the alleged wrongdoing act might also partly determine whether staff report this wrongdoing. For example, staff are not as likely to report wrongdoing that was committed by more senior members of the organization (Miceli et al., 1991). Individuals at the top of a hierarchy may have developed strong relationships with the authorities to receive the report and may be able to retaliate. This retaliation may also be motivated by the attempt to prevent further whistle blowing.

References

Ahmad, S. A., Yunos, R. M., Ahmad, R. A. R., & Sanusi, Z. M. (2014). Whistleblowing behaviour: The influence of ethical climates theory. Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 164, 445-450.
Alleyne, P. (2016). The influence of organisational commitment and corporate ethical values on non-public accountants' whistle-blowing intentions in Barbados. Journal of Applied Accounting Research.
Alleyne, P., Hudaib, M., & Haniffa, R. (2018). The moderating role of perceived organisational support in breaking the silence of public accountants. Journal of Business Ethics, 147(3), 509-527.
Caillier, J. G. (2013). Do employees feel comfortable blowing the whistle when their supervisors practice transformational leadership? International Journal of Public Administration, 36(14), 1020-1028.
Chaudhary, N. S., Gupta, K. P., & Phoolka, S. (2019). A study of whistle-blowing intentions of teachers working in higher education sector. International Journal of Law and Management.
Chaudhary, N. S., Phoolka, S., Sengar, R., & Pande, S. (2019). Whistleblowing in Indian higher education sector: a qualitative study. International Journal of Learning and Change, 11(2), 145-168.
Chen, L. (2019). A review of research on whistle-blowing. American Journal of Industrial and Business Management, 9: 295-305.
Cho, Y. J., and Song, H. J. (2015). Determinants of whistleblowing within government agencies. Public Pers. Manage. 44, 450–472.
Curtis, M. B. (2006). Are audit-related ethical decisions dependent upon mood? Journal of Business Ethics, 68(2), 191-209.
Erturk, A., & Donmez, E. (2016). Relationship between Leadership Styles of School Principals and Whistleblowing Behaviors of Teachers. Universal Journal of Educational Research, 4(n12A), 55-62.
Hidayah, R., Suryandari, D., Khayati, I. N., & Yanto, H. (2019). Attitude, subjective norm, and whistleblowing intention on Higher Education. The Journal of Social Sciences Research, 5(11), 1555-1561.
Iko Afe, C. E., Abodohoui, A., Mebounou, T., & Karuranga, E. (2019). Perceived organizational climate and whistleblowing intention in academic organizations: Evidence from Selçuk University (Turkey). Eurasian Business Review, 9(3), 299-318.
Kamarunzaman, N. Z., Zawawi, A. A., & Hussin, Z. H. (2014). Reporting misdeeds: An evaluation on intention to blowing the whistle. International Journal of Social Science and Humanity, 4(4), 269.
Keenan, J. P. (2000). Blowing the whistle on less serious forms of fraud: A study of executives and managers. Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, 12(4), 199-217.
Latan, H., Ringle, C. M., Chiappetta, J., & Charbel, J. (2018). Whistleblowing intentions among public accountants in Indonesia: testing for the moderation effects. Journal of Business Ethics, 152, 573–58.
Liu, S. M., Liao, J. Q., & Wei, H. (2015). Authentic leadership and whistleblowing: Mediating roles of psychological safety and personal identification. Journal of Business Ethics, 131(1), 107-119.
Miceli, M. P., Near, J. P., & Schwenk, C. R. (1991). Who blows the whistle and why? ILR Review, 45(1), 113-130
Mesmer-Magnus, J. R., & Viswesvaran, C. (2005). Whistleblowing in organizations: An examination of correlates of whistleblowing intentions, actions, and retaliation. Journal of business ethics, 62(3), 277-297.
Mohamed, I. S., Belaja, K., & Rozzani, N. (2019). Whistleblowers’ role in mitigating fraud of Malaysian higher education institutions. Asian Journal of Accounting Perspectives, 12(2), 67-81.
Nicholls, A. R., Fairs, L. R., Toner, J., Jones, L., Mantis, C., Barkoukis, V., ... & Schomöller, A. (2021). Snitches get stitches and end up in ditches: A systematic review of the factors associated with whistleblowing intentions. Frontiers in Psychology, 12.
Olesen, A. P., Amin, L., Mahadi, Z., & Ibrahim, M. (2019). Whistle blowing and research integrity: Potential remedy for research misconduct in Malaysian institutions of higher education. Accountability in Research, 26(1), 17-32.
Park, C., & Keil, M. (2009). Organizational silence and whistle‐blowing on IT projects: An integrated model. Decision Sciences, 40(4), 901-918.
Radulovic, U., & Uys, T. (2019). Academic dishonesty and whistleblowing in a higher education institution: a sociological analysis. African Journal of Business Ethics, 13(2).
Robertson, J. C., Stefaniak, C. M., & Curtis, M. B. (2011). Does wrongdoer reputation matter? Impact of auditor-wrongdoer performance and likeability reputations on fellow auditors' intention to take action and choice of reporting outlet. Behavioral Research in Accounting, 23(2), 207-234.
Rustiarini, N. W., & Sunarsih, N. M. (2017). Factors influencing the whistleblowing behaviour: a perspective from the theory of planned behaviour. Asian Journal of Business and Accounting, 10(2), 187-214.
Shawver, T. (2008). What accounting students think about whistleblowing: Are future accounting professionals willing to whistleblow internally or externally for ethics violations? Management Accounting Quarterly, 9(4).
Sims, R. L., & Keenan, J. P. (1998). Predictors of external whistleblowing: Organizational and intrapersonal variables. Journal of Business Ethics, 17(4), 411-421.
Tumuramye, B., Ntayi, J. M., & Muhwezi, M. (2018). Whistle-blowing intentions and behaviour in Ugandan public procurement. Journal of Public Procurement.
Xu, Y., & Ziegenfuss, D. E. (2008). Reward systems, moral reasoning, and internal auditors' reporting wrongdoing. Journal of Business Psychology, 22, 323–331.

Return to top

Return to menu

Blockchain in tertiary education institutions

Introduction to bitcoin

Since the advent of cryptocurrencies, many scholars have discussed how the underlying technology, called blockchain, could benefit tertiary education institutions. This document outlines the existing and potential benefits of blockchain technology. However, another document will explore one of the main provisions that emanated from this technology: nonfungible tokens.

To appreciate how they can utilize blockchains, institutions should understand the key features of this technology. Knowledge of bitcoin may help institutions understand these features. Satoshi Nakamoto, who is either an individual or team of individuals, developed this blockchain in 2008.

To demonstrate bitcoin, imagine that a network of people, such as Adam, Betty, Carl, and Donna, have each saved $100. Now suppose they complete work to help one another, but at a fee.

Adam pays Betty 20 dollars to complete some work
Fred pays Donna 30 dollars to complete some work
Betty pays Betty 10 dollars to complete some work
George pays Adam 50 dollars to complete some work
Betty pays Enid 10 dollars to complete some work
Donna pays Betty 20 dollars to complete some work

Rather than exchange money each time, they could simply maintain a record of these transactions, called a ledger. If they maintain this ledger

the computer might calculate the amount each person has saved
for example, in this ledger, Adam has paid $20 and earned $50—and, combined with his original $100, has saved $130
the individuals can thus continue to pay to receive some product or service, provided their savings exceed 0

This ledger—this summary of their transactions—is thus sufficient to maintain an economy, even if individuals never actually exchange cash. One problem, however, is that individuals could falsify the transactions. Betty could insert the transaction “Adam pays Betty 20 dollars to complete some work” even if Betty did not complete the work. To prevent this problem, transactions are dismissed unless the other party, in this instance Adam, approves the transaction. To approve the transaction in this instance

Adam can insert a digital signature
a digital signature is a series of 1s and 0s—like 1010010001000110001001—that depends on both a private key, like a password, that only Adam knows and the information in the transaction
the algorithm that generates this signature has been carefully designed to enable other people to verify, but not to produce, the signature

If only server or hard drive stored this ledger, problems could unfold. The person who accesses this server or hard drive could deliberately or inadvertently delete a transaction, for example. This problem would dissipate, however, if all members of this network received the same copy of this ledger and could then assess this ledger. A procedure, called Proof of Work, was designed to achieve this goal.

Introduction to bitcoin: Hash functions

Proof of Work utilizes an algorithm, called hash functions. Specifically, researchers have invented a formula or algorithm, called a hash function, that can convert any message into a string of 0s and 1s—like 0010101000100100001001001100100100010—that, at first glance, looks random. One special hash function, called SHA256, converts any message, such as “Adam pays Betty 20 dollars to complete some work” into a series of 256 0s and 1s called a hash value.

The code that generates this hash value, although complicated, is accessible. Although accessible, several features of this algorithm are especially beneficial. First, each message is converted to a unique sequence of 0s and 1s. Even trivial changes to the message can generate an entirely different sequence. For example

“Adam pays Betty 20 dollars to complete some work” might generate the hash value 010101 and 250 more 0s and 1s
“Bdam pays Betty 20 dollars to complete some work”, although similar, might generate a very different hash value, such as 111000 and 250 different 0s and 1s

Second, nobody knows how to reverse the translation, at least not yet. To illustrate

suppose “Adam pays Betty 20 dollars to complete some work” generates the hash value 010101 and 250 more 0s and 1s
if someone received this hash value, they could not determine the original message was “Adam pays Betty 20 dollars to complete some work”, even if they could access the most powerful supercomputer

Introduction to bitcoin: The rules that govern proof of work

Proof of work is a competition, between users of a network, designed to verify the legitimacy of a ledger. The competition, in essence, comprises several phases. First, one user, such as Adam, decides to submit a set of transactions to the network. The transactions might include

Adam pays Betty 20 bitcoin to complete some work: signed
Fred pays Donna 30 bitcoin to complete some work: signed
Betty pays Betty 10 bitcoin to complete some work: signed

Second, each user receives this set of transactions, coupled with a potential reward they could earn if they prevail in the competition, followed by a number, called a nonce. In the following example, one user, called Zane, could earn 50 bitcoin if they prevail in this competition. And, the nonce is 0.

Adam pays Betty 20 bitcoin to complete some work: signed
Fred pays Donna 30 bitcoin to complete some work: signed
Betty pays Betty 10 bitcoin to complete some work: signed
Zane will earn 50 bitcoin if he wins. 0

Third, users who want to participate in this competition enter this information into the hash algorithm, generating a hash value, such as 101001 and 250 different 0s and 1s. Fourth, users can use some computer program to repeat this procedure, thousands of times, each time raising the last number or nonce by one. For instance, the computer program might enter the following information into the hash algorithm, generating a hash value, such as 011001 and 250 different 0s and 1s

Adam pays Betty 20 bitcoin to complete some work: signed
Fred pays Donna 30 bitcoin to complete some work: signed
Betty pays Betty 10 bitcoin to complete some work: signed
Zane will earn 50 bitcoin if he wins. 1

The goal of users is to continue to generate these hash values until the first 10 numbers are 0. The first user who achieves this target is the victor and earns bitcoin as a reward. Usually, users will need to test about a billion combinations before they reach the target, typically lasting about 10 minutes. Generally, the victor is a user who

can access a powerful computer—a computer that complete many operations in a limited time, or
is fortunate during this round

After this victory, other users can check this solution. That is, some users will confirm the information, including the transactions, the reward to the users, and the nonce, does indeed generate a hash in which the first 10 values are 0. This phase confirms the victor did indeed complete all the work that is necessary to fulfill the target.

Next, this solution—that is, the transactions, the reward to the users, and the nonce—is appended to previous solutions. Each solution is called a block. And the sequence of solutions over time is called a block chain.

Introduction to bitcoin: The purpose of this competition

This proof of work competition might seem like fun. But actually, proof of work is central to the integrity of Bitcoin. Specifically, in principle, users could generate a fraudulent ledger. However, the proof of work competition diminishes the likelihood that users will generate a fraudulent ledger—or at least increases the likelihood that users will detect a fraudulent ledger. The reason is

to prevail in these competitions, users need to consume extensive computer power
if users exert this effort, their work is likely to be legitimate
that is, if users wanted to generate fraudulent ledgers, they would not exert this level of effort—because the benefits of this fraud would not outweigh the costs of this effort.

To illustrate how this rationale legitimizes bitcoin, suppose that

users received two conflicting ledgers
they were informed, however, that only one ledger, when subjected to SHA256, generates a hash value in which the first 10 values are 0
users would thus agree that more effort was dedicated to the ledger that generated this hash value—and, therefore, this ledger is more likely to be legitimate.

Introduction to bitcoin: Clarifications

This attempt to explain bitcoin is, admittedly, incomplete and inaccurate. For example, to prevail in the competition, the number of 0s the precede the first 1 in hash value does not need to be 10 or more. Actually, to increase the difficulty of this task, bitcoin gradually increase this number over time.

Second, if users prevail in this competition, they do not necessarily receive 50 bitcoin. Again, this reward tends to change over time.

Third, the information that users must subject to this algorithm does not only include the algorithm, reward, and nonce. Instead, this information also needs to include the previous block—or, more precisely, the solution of this previous block.

Introduction to other phases of blockchain

Bitcoin is only one of many thousands of cryptocurrencies. Other cryptocurrencies include Ethereum, Tether, Dogecoin, and Polygon. To illustrate

Ethereum is a cryptocurrency but also a distinct platform that supports other cryptocurrencies, applications, or tools, such as smart contracts.
Tether differs from Bitcoin and Ethereum, because the value of this cryptocurrency is connected to the value of U.S. dollars and the Euro, diminishing the volatility of these coins
Dogecoin, although launched as a joke, became a dominant cryptocurrency. No limit is imposed on the number of Dogecoins that users can create.
Cardano, like Ethereum, utilizes a method called proof-of-stake to verify the ledges—a technique that overrides the pronounced time and use of energy that proof-of-work consumes
Zcash utilizes a method called proof-of-zero-knowledge to verify the ledges—a method that can more effectively, but imperfectly, protect the identity of users

Swan (2015) divided the evolution of blockchain into three phases. Blockchain 1.0 relates to the original use of blockchain technology: cryptocurrency—or payments that obviated the need to depend on a mediator, such as a bank. Blockchain 2.0 then extended these applications to financial transactions that transcend the transfer of cash, such as transactions in bonds, stocks, and smart property—that is, property represented by a digital signature. Blockchain 3.0 then concerned the application of blockchain to sectors that transcend finances, such as art, culture, health, science, and government.

Blockchain 2.0 coincided with the development of smart contracts—programs embedded in the blockchain that stipulates an agreement between parties as well as automatically transfers digital assets whenever some condition is fulfilled (Swan, 2015). Although first promulgated by the Ethereum platform, many other blockchain platforms enable smart contracts.

Key benefits of blockchain technology: Overview

Several of the features and attributes of blockchain technology may benefit tertiary education (e.g., Chen et al., 2018). To illustrate, the first attribute is that blockchain technology can store information reliably and securely. That is, the information this technology stores is unlikely to be compromised. Previously, only a confined number of teams or institutions—and sometimes one team or institution—maintained the ledgers or databases of information. Since the advent of blockchain technology, however, many thousands of individuals, teams, or institutions may contribute to the integrity of these ledgers or databases of information. One point of failure will not compromise the accuracy or validity of the information that is stored.

A second attribute revolves around the efficiency of blockchain technology. Previously, intermediaries would need to manage and to verify transactions. For example, when individuals need to transfer money, financial administrators in banks or other institutions would need to clear and settle financial transactions. In contrast, when blockchain technology is utilized, many of these procedures are automated.

To characterize the key attributes or features of blockchain technology more comprehensively—especially the attributes or features that could benefit tertiary education—Alammary et al. (2019) conducted a systematic literature. To conduct this systematic review, the search terms combined “blockchain” with “education”, “learning”, and “teaching”. When entered into various databases, 2321 articles were suggested. However, only 31 articles complied with the eligibility criteria.

Alammary et al. (2019) distilled from these publications the key attributes or features of blockchain technology that could benefit tertiary education. According to this analysis

blockchain technology enhances accountability and transparency, because all transactions—such as the evaluation of student assignments—can be verified publicly or initiated automatically, with the reliance of smart contracts
blockchain technology increases the security of data, diminishing breaches of privacy, integrity, and manipulation of data
blockchain technology can regulate which individuals can access student data more effectively
blockchain technology may diminish the costs of transactions, monitoring, and storage of data
blockchain technology can be utilized to authenticate the identity of students more effectively

Key benefits of blockchain technology: Case study

To illustrate some of these benefits of this technology to tertiary education, Lam and Dongol (2022) designed a comprehensive e-learning platform that applies a blockchain to enhance security, trust, and transparency. This platform utilizes smart contracts—protocols or rules that initiate transactions in response to some action—to overcome problems with existing platforms.

In particular, Lam and Dongol (2022) designed this platform to circumvent some of the existing limitations of e-learning. First, according to Lam and Dongol (2022), students are often unsure of the expectations around assignments or uncertain of the marking criteria, compromising the transparency of assessments. Second, students often experience problems when they complete some of their degree at one institution and some of their degree at another institution. In these circumstances, the two institutions do not always recognize the credentials of one another. Credit transfer can be delayed over months, impeding future collaborations across universities. Third, many institutions and employers perceive online education is illegitimate. Employers may reject applicants who completed their education online.

To overcome these problems, Lam and Dongol (2022) designed a comprehensive e-learning platform. The platform comprises many smart contracts and other complications. However, the authors presented enough information to enable anyone to construct the platform themselves.

The platform included some helpful features. For instance, this platform introduced smart contracts, embedded in the blockchain, that could delineate the marking criteria and expectations of student assignments. The smart contracts, in some instance, could even grade the assignments of students automatically. In addition, the smart contracts could also stipulate all the assessment procedures, such as how grades are moderated and how appeals are managed, improving transparency.

Furthermore, the blockchain was designed to store information about the precise activities that students have completed. Consequently, other stakeholders, such as employers, could readily appraise the skills these students have developed.

Finally, the platform was accessible to multiple institutions. When multiple institutions utilize the same blockchain, these institutions can recognize the credentials of one another more efficiently. Consequently, students could more readily complete some of their degree at one institution and some of their degree at another institution. Students could choose which classes to attend across several universities, personalizing their experience.

Lam and Dongol (2022) also conducted a study to assess whether staff and students are likely to appreciate the platform. Two experienced teaching staff and two university students were exposed to a demonstration of this platform. To evaluate this platform, these individuals then participated in interviews as well as completed a short survey. All participants evaluated the platform favorably. For example

all participants felt this platform could enhance the trust of employers and other stakeholders in online education credentials
two participants suggested that blockchain might diminish the likelihood of disputes about the past education of graduates
the participants also felt that platform could enable students to personalize their studies more effectively, because they could select courses from multiple institutions
participants felt the assessments were more transparent as a consequence of the smart contracts

Key benefits of blockchain technology: Assessments of joint assignments.

Students often complete assignments jointly or collectively. That is, students often need to collaborate with one another to produce an output, such as a report or presentation. Often, all the students in the team receive the same grade. Unfortunately, students do not equally contribute to these assignments. Attempts to circumvent this problem—such as asking students to estimate the contribution of their peers—may culminate in a range of complications.

As Chen et al. (2018) argue, blockchain technology could address this problem. That is, blockchain can record the contributions of each person—and educators can then distribute marks that depend on the level of these contributions.

Key benefits of blockchain technology: The legitimacy of examinations

Tertiary education institutions can also utilize blockchain technology to audit the examinations more securely, transparently, and effectively. For example, Mitchell et al. (2019) developed a prototype, called Decentralised Application for Examination Review or dAppER to achieve this goal. Specifically, to improve the quality of examinations, a lecturer often constructs an examination paper, a moderator evaluates the paper, often delivering feedback or suggestions, the lecturer may revise the examination paper, and an external examiner can check the concerns were addressed. If possible, an auditor, such as a representative of an accreditation body, can assess this approach.

Mitchell et al. (2019) utilized software, called HyperLedger Fabric, to construct a prototype that utilizes blockchain to complete all these procedures. Smart contracts—the rules embedded in the blockchain—specify who can access the examination at any point in the procedure. The prototype was applied three times to three exams, and the various actions were recorded accurately. The key benefits of this reliance on blockchain technology are that

the data are permanent and immutable—and thus trusted by auditors
mistakes, if identified, can be corrected, and these corrections can be stored on the blockchain
the protocol is likely to be scalable; that is, access times should not increase as more records are stored, at least not in the foreseeable future

Key benefits of blockchain technology: Motivation to study

Educators could also utilize blockchain technology to motivate students and to improve their behavior. To illustrate, Chen et al. (2018) argued that smart contracts—the rules embedded in a blockchain—could be applied to motivate and to reward students (see also Sharples & Domingue, 2016). For example, whenever students complete specific activities that educators have recommended, such as to assist a peer, they could receive a digital currency. The students could then use this currency to arrange other helpful or rewarding activities. For example, students could use this currency to

arrange some additional tuition
participate in scarce opportunities, such as an overseas exchange program
extend the due date on an assignment, and so forth

Therefore, students could receive a currency at no financial cost to the institution. Admittedly, educators could introduce this scheme without blockchain technology. However, several distinct features of blockchain technology enhances this scheme. For example

smart contracts—in essence, automated rules or protocols that simulate a traditional contract—are embedded in the blocks and thus simple to apply
the digital currency is more trustworthy and transparent than other alternatives, such as points that are stored in Excel spreadsheets

Key benefits of blockchain technology: A secure record of certificates and awards

Tertiary institutions must store information about the achievements, certificates, and awards that students have received, such as their transcripts, indefinitely. According to many scholars (e.g., Castro & Au-Yong-Oliveira, 2021), tertiary education institutions should perhaps apply blockchain technology to store this information more securely. When institutions utilize blockchain

these records are not as likely to be compromised in the future; that is, this information is relatively impervious to both failure and to fraud
these records can potentially be accessed more efficiently,

Because of these benefits, several institutions do utilize blockchain technology to fulfil this goal.

For example,

the University of Nicosia in Cyprus maintains records of the certificates that students received after completing MOOCs on blockchain technology (Sharples & Domingue 2016)
MIT, in collaboration with the Learning Machine company, developed a platform of digital badges that students can earn when they complete online classes that is stored in a blockchain (Skiba 2017).
Holberton School stores degrees in a blockchain

Key benefits of blockchain technology: A secure record of competencies

Similarly, Funk et al. (2018) suggested that blockchain could be used to store the competencies that students have achieved and the substantiated professional activities these students have completed. That is, to be accredited in a profession, increasingly more individuals need to demonstrate they have fulfilled a range of competencies, developed a range of skills, or completed a range of professional activities. Blockchain could be a digital ledger that stores all the competencies, skills, and professional experiences of students. Accreditation bodies can use this information to approve the professional registration of students. Blockchain outperforms other alternatives because

many individuals and organizations, such as students and accreditation bodies, can access the same blockchain; data, for example, does not need to be transferred from a repository that universities access to a repository accreditation bodies access
institutions can utilize the provisions of smart contracts to stipulate the rules that users need to fulfill, such as the competencies that students need to achieve, clarifying the expectations of these individuals
the data would be trustworthy, enduring, and relatively impervious to fraud or corruption.

As Mikroyannidis et al. (2018) discussed, these provisions could also facilitate lifelong learning. That is, Mikroyannidis et al. describe a typical scenario that students might enjoy. Students often want to extend their qualifications but are too busy to study. Instead, they want to pursue informal opportunities, such as short courses, and receive some recognition of this development, such as digital badges. To underpin these efforts, they create a learning passport or ePortfolio, that outlines the courses they have completed, the artefacts they have developed, such as blogs or videos, and the digital badges they have accrued—and enable other users to access subsets of this profile or to share information.

This platform, if designed effectively, could generate a range of benefits. For example, institutions could develop a platform that enables users to

seek other relevant courses and pay to complete these courses
deliver feedback on the courses they complete, earning points or other rewards
identify peers who would like to develop similar capabilities—and thus agree to be mentored in exchange for money, rewards, or points—points that enhance the reputation of these users
demonstrate their skills to potential employers or to seek a promotion in their organization
identify users who share complementary skills or similar goals—to establish supportive networks

Admittedly, many learning passports or ePortfolios are not reliant on blockchain technology. However, blockchain technology enhances the security and functionality of these tools. For example

blockchain technology diminishes the likelihood that other people can change or copy the data
blockchain technology may detect other fraud, such as pairs of individuals who unfairly assist one another
when blockchain technology is utilized, the users tend to own the data, because the data are not recorded in a single institution; the users can thus develop smart contracts to delineate who can access the data
when blockchain technology is utilized, the records are immutable and thus secure

More importantly, because the records are stored on blockchain, and do not reside in a single institution, the data can be more readily shared across many organizations—provided these organizations are members of this network. The data are thus more transferable.

Key benefits of blockchain technology: Staff promotions and advancement

Blockchain technology might also benefit the teaching staff, and not only the students, of tertiary education institutions. To illustrate, Funk et al. (2018) suggested that blockchain could help educators demonstrate the practices they have applied to enhance student learning and development, increasing the likelihood of promotions for example. According to the authors, in one blockchain, each block could represent a specific course or resource that educators have developed. The block would not store the actual course or resource, but perhaps include data on

the location in which this resource is stored
who developed this resource
the time these academics devoted to this resource
other activities these academics initiated to enhance the use of this resource

Administrators can later utilize information that is stored in the blockchain to ascertain which academics developed the most useful or popular resources and the effort that academics had devoted to this activity. The benefit of blockchain over alternative databases is

the data can be transparent to all users, including students
hence, individuals are more likely to trust the legitimacy of these evaluations

More importantly, if students continue to participate in the future, the blockchain can also store information about their career progress. Administrators, therefore, will be able calculate which practices of educators predict the future success of students. Educators might earn rewards because activities they initiated years ago facilitated the progress of students more recently.

Key benefits of blockchain technology: Other provisions

In short, blockchain technology can benefit tertiary education institutions. If these institutions utilize blockchain technology

joint assignments can be graded more fairly
examinations can be audited more effectively
credentials, degrees, competences, skills, and professional activities can be stored more securely and can be accessible to more relevant stakeholders
the contributions of staff can be evaluated more accurately
students can be motivated, perhaps with various digital currencies, more effectively

The systematic review that Alammary et al. (2019) conducted uncovered other potential benefits of blockchain to tertiary education. According to this review, besides all these applications, blockchain technology could also

protect learning objects from destruction or unauthorized modifications (e.g., Funk et al., 2018)
manage fees and credit transfer
obtaining digital consent from guardians
manage copyright and, in particular, preserve the ownership rights of learning materials—by recording the contributions of each user (e.g., Hori et al., 2018)

Challenges of blockchain in tertiary education

In their systematic review, Alammary et al. (2019) also uncovered many challenges that institutions need to consider. For example

blockchain technology may incur a range of costs, such as the costs of computer power, changes in infrastructure, and delayed transactions
some authors were concerned that, because blockchains are immutable, some necessary changes—such as changes because of updated laws or identified errors—may be hard to initiate
some institutions do not trust the blockchain technology enough to share data, sometimes because they are concerned about security and privacy
one publication was concerned that data, if owned by the users, could diminish the accessibility of these data to other applications

References

Al Harthy, K., Al Shuhaimi, F., & Al Ismaily, K. K. J. (2019, January). The upcoming Blockchain adoption in Higher-education: requirements and process. In 2019 4th MEC international conference on big data and smart city (ICBDSC) (pp. 1-5). IEEE.
Alammary, A., Alhazmi, S., Almasri, M., & Gillani, S. (2019). Blockchain-based applications in education: A systematic review. Applied Sciences, 9(12), 2400.
Arndt, T., & Guercio, A. (2020). Blockchain-based transcripts for mobile higher-education. International Journal of Information and Education Technology, 10(2), 84-89.
Awaji, B., Solaiman, E., & Albshri, A. (2020). Blockchain-based applications in higher education: A systematic mapping study. In Proceedings of the 5th international conference on information and education innovations (pp. 96-104).
Bucea-Manea-Țoniş, R., Martins, O. M., Bucea-Manea-Țoniş, R., Gheorghiță, C., Kuleto, V., Ilić, M. P., & Simion, V. E. (2021). Blockchain technology enhances sustainable higher education. Sustainability, 13(22).
Castro, R. Q., & Au-Yong-Oliveira, M. (2021). Blockchain and higher education diplomas. European Journal of Investigation in Health, Psychology and Education, 11(1), 154-167.
Chen, G., Xu, B., Lu, M., & Chen, N. S. (2018). Exploring blockchain technology and its potential applications for education. Smart Learning Environments, 5(1).
Fedorova, E. P., & Skobleva, E. I. (2020). Application of blockchain technology in higher education. European Journal of Contemporary Education, 9(3), 552-571.
Funk, E., Riddell, J., Ankel, F., & Cabrera, D. (2018). Blockchain technology: a data framework to improve validity, trust, and accountability of information exchange in health professions education. Academic Medicine, 93(12), 1791-1794.
Haugsbakken, H., & Langseth, I. (2019). The blockchain challenge for higher education institutions. European Journal of Education, 2(3), 41.
Hori, M., Ono, S., Miyashita, K., Kobayashi, S., Miyahara, H., Kita, T., ... & Yamaji, K. (2018). Learning System based on Decentralized Learning Model using Blockchain and SNS. In CSEDU (1) (pp. 183-190).
Idrees, S. M., Aijaz, I., Jameel, R., & Nowostawski, M. (2021). Exploring the Blockchain Technology: Issues, Applications and Research Potential. International Journal of Online & Biomedical Engineering, 17(7).
Kamišalić, A., Turkanović, M., Mrdović, S., & Heričko, M. (2019). A preliminary review of blockchain-based solutions in higher education. In International workshop on learning technology for education in cloud (pp. 114-124). Springer, Cham.
Kuleto, V., Bucea-Manea-Țoniş, R., Bucea-Manea-Țoniş, R., Ilić, M. P., Martins, O. M., Ranković, M., & Coelho, A. S. (2022). The potential of blockchain technology in higher education as perceived by students in Serbia, Romania, and Portugal. Sustainability, 14(2).
Lam, T. Y., & Dongol, B. (2022). A blockchain-enabled e-learning platform. Interactive Learning Environments, 30(7), 1229-1251.
Lizcano, D., Lara, J. A., White, B., & Aljawarneh, S. (2020). Blockchain-based approach to create a model of trust in open and ubiquitous higher education. Journal of Computing in Higher Education, 32(1), 109-134.
Mikroyannidis, A., Domingue, J., Bachler, M., & Quick, K. (2018, June). A learner-centred approach for lifelong learning powered by the blockchain. In EdMedia+ innovate learning (pp. 1388-1393). Association for the Advancement of Computing in Education (AACE).
Mitchell, I., Hara, S., & Sheriff, M. (2019). dAppER: decentralised application for examination review. In 2019 IEEE 12th International Conference on Global Security, Safety and Sustainability (ICGS3) (pp. 1-14). IEEE.
Palma, L. M., Vigil, M. A., Pereira, F. L., & Martina, J. E. (2019). Blockchain and smart contracts for higher education registry in Brazil. International Journal of Network Management, 29(3).
Raimundo, R., & Rosário, A. (2021). Blockchain system in the higher education. European Journal of Investigation in Health, Psychology and Education, 11(1), 276-293.
Sharma, S., & Batth, R. S. (2020, June). Blockchain technology for higher education system: A mirror review. In 2020 International Conference on Intelligent Engineering and Management (ICIEM) (pp. 348-353). IEEE.
Sharples, M., & Domingue, J. (2016). The blockchain and kudos: A distributed system for educational record, reputation and reward. In European conference on technology enhanced learning (pp. 490-496). Springer, Cham.
Skiba, D. J. (2017). The potential of blockchain in education and health care. Nursing ducation Perspectives, 38(4), 220-221.
Swan, M. (2015). Blockchain: Blueprint for a new economy. O'Reilly Media, Inc.
Turkanović, M., Hölbl, M., Košič, K., Heričko, M., & Kamišalić, A. (2018). EduCTX: A blockchain-based higher education credit platform. IEEE access, 6, 5112-5127.
Vidal, F., Gouveia, F., & Soares, C. (2019, October). Analysis of blockchain technology for higher education. In 2019 International Conference on Cyber-Enabled Distributed Computing and Knowledge Discovery (CyberC) (pp. 28-33). IEEE.
Widayanti, R., Purnama Harahap, E., Lutfiani, N., Putri Oganda, F., & Manik, I. S. P. (2021). The Impact of Blockchain Technology in Higher Education Quality Improvement. Jurnal Ilmiah Teknik Elektro Komputer dan Informatika, 7, 207-216.
Wüst, K., & Gervais, A. (2017). Do you need a blockchain? IACR Cryptology
Zhong, J., Xie, H., Zou, D., & Chui, D. K. (2018). A blockchain model for word-learning systems. In 2018 5th international conference on behavioral, economic, and socio-cultural computing (BESC) (pp. 130-131). IEEE.

Return to top

Return to menu